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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST.A.TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF l ... T.A.H, 
Pl.aintz~ff a;nd Re8pondent. 
\S. 
E. B. ERWIX. HAR.RY FIKCH and 
R. 0. PE..lliCE. 
Defendants and .A.ppellants. 
CASE 
NO. 6200 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT E. B. ERWIN 
STATE~EXT OF CASE 
Th~ grand jury of Salt Lake County returned an 
indictment accusing E. B. Erwin, Harry Finch, Frank 
A. Thacker (who 'Ya=' acquitted), R. 0. Pearce and Ben 
Harmon (now deceased) of thB crime of criminal con-
spiracy in violation of 103-11-1 R. S. 1933. Unless oth-
erwise indica ted it:alics are supplied. 
The grand jury found : 
The grand jurors . . . accuse E. B. Erwin 
... Df the crime of criminal conspiracy . . . com-
mitted as follows: 
. . . the said E. B. Erwin (and others) 
... on the 6th day of January, 1936, and 
on ~divers other days and times between that day 
and the first day of January, 1938, did . 
agree, combine, cons.piTe, confederate, and en-
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gage to ... commit acts injurious to public mor-
.. als and fqr.the perversion and obstruction of jus-
'tice a;nd the due administration of the laws of 
' ' ' 
... Utah, to-wit: 
. . . the s1a:id E. B. Erwin (and others) . . . did 
. . . agree, .combine, conspire·, confederate, and 
engage to . . . permi,t, allow, as~sris·t, and enruble 
···houses of ill fame ... and lotteries, dice g-ames, 
· slot machines, book making, and other gambling 
devices and games o.f chance (card and poker 
' games ~are not mentioned in indictment) to ibe 
kept, maintained, and ope~rated at various 
places in Salt Lake City . . . the said defend-
ant's then and there weU knowing that s~aid . . . 
· · · ( place,s) were being kept, maintaine~ and op-
1 · .erated in . . . Salt Lake City in violation of 
( la-'v) . . . and in furtheDance of said conspiracy 
did ·commit the following overt acts : 
1. . . . between March 15, 1936, and J,a.nu-
ary 1, 1938, the ... defendants permitted, allowed, 
assis,ted and enabled house·s. of ill fame ... to 
:be kept, maintained and operated at van·ous 
pl,aces in Salt Lake City ... 
2. . . . between ( sam·e date's) the . . . de-
. fendants permitted, allowed, assisted and ena-
, bled lotteries, dice game·s, slot machines, and 
book making and other games of chance and 
gambling devices to be kept ... at various 
places in Salt Lake City .... 
3. That on or about the 1~s·t day of each .. · 
month between ... June, 1937, .and January, 
1938 . . . t·he defendants ooll·e~cted money from 
· · the operators of various houses of ill fame in 
various places in iSal t Lake City . . . 
4. That at various times hetiWeen April 1, 
1936, ~a.nd January .1, 1938, the defendants col-
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lected and c-aused to be collected 1noney from 
the operators of various lot~terie's, dice games, 
slot machines. book-making, and other gamos of 
chance and gambling devices at various places 
in Salt Lake City ... contrary to ... statutes 
... of Utah .. 
Ca.rl ,,.... . Buehner, Forem·an. 
Endorsed ''A True Bill'', ·Carl W. Buehner, 
Foreman. 
**STA..TE)fEXT OF FACTS 
The conspiracy is alleged to have commenced at the 
time Mr. Erwin was sworn in as mayor (2! months be-
fore Mr. Finch became chief of police) and ended the 
1st day of January, 1938. 
None of the defendants was an operator of any of 
the houses of vice mentioned. 
The only money paid by the underworld was paid 
to (1) Abe Stubeck (774 and 787) and (2) Golden Holt 
(970). 
None of the money collected was ever paid to Mr. 
Erwin. Money collected in 1936 was paid to Abe Rosen-
blum. Money collected in 1937 was paid to Ben Harmon 
(now deceased). 
The overt acts consist of: 
1. and 2. Permitted houses of vice to re-
main open. 
3. and 4. Collecting ~oney from houses of 
VICe. 
**Unless · otherwlise indi.ooted the figirures in parentheses refer to 
lpages of the record. The .record is£<> voluliDJinous tlla;t we concluded 
it ;would be more :SaJtislfaotory to the court to refer only to irOOOrd 
pages :rather than .to xecord and abstract and •supplemental aJb-
'S'traet pages. 
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The alleged ·conspirators were not related to each 
other nor we-re they clUib, poli ti~cal, fl'laternal, social, re-
ligious or p~rofessional friends. None of them were in 
hu·sinHss together. 
Mr. Erwin was elected mayor of Salt Lake City 
in the eleetion of 1935 and was sworn in office in Jan-
uary, 1936. He was assigned to the dep1artment of public 
safety. 
Mr. Finch h3Jd been in business in ;Salt Lake City for 
up>Wards of forty-five years, had been a eity commis-
sioner f:or ten. years ( 1510). In the above et:ection he 
supported Mr. Erwin's opponent. He met Mr. Erwin 
aft~eT the primary in 1g.35 in Mr. A. 8. Brown's of-
fice (1512). Mr. Finch was known favorab[y ib~ gTeat 
groups of per.sorrs in the· city 1an:d by the City Conmris-
sion. In February, 1936, he was nominated for chief 
of police by Mr. Erwin and was appointed by the city 
coiilllllsslon. The appointment took effect March 15, 
1936. 
Mr. Pearce is an attorney and Wlas the atton1ey 
for Mr. Harmon. On one occasion he us1ed Mr. Erwin 
as -a witness in a city court ease which was filed in 1934. 
Mr. Erwin was not a party to .that suit. 
Mr. Thacker had ,he·en a police officer for many 
year.s. He w·as acqu.itted of being a conspirator in this 
action. 
Mr. Hannon is dleceased. There is no evidence that 
he ~nd Mr. Erwin were aeqUlainted with each other. Mr. 
Harmon .and Mr. Finch were a-cquainted and in the 
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past had been eompetitors in the rPstauraJlt bns.ine~ss. 
There is no eYidence that Mr. Erwin (or ·any other 
defendant for that Inatter) r.onspired or agreed with 
any other person to do the thing~ alleg~l in the indict-
ment 'Or to do the things alleged by Mr. Romney in the 
bill of particulars. (~ore ,n.n be sajd about the ibill of 
particulars later). 
There is no evidence that Mr. Erwin ever knew the 
witness Stubeck. Witness Holt was a police officer who 
had been connected mth prostitution in this city for 
many years and was the recipient of money and am 
O'vercoat fronz prosti-tutes (940). He had been present 
on one occasi{)n during a conference when Mr. Erwin 
was present. 
There Wtas no evidence of an agreement. The state 
does n-ot contend there was any direct evidence of an 
agreement. The court so instructed the jury in instruc-
tion No. 7 (A b. 264). To sustain the charge of agree-
ment we must search for indirect or circumstantial evi-
dence which supports the charge. There is no such evi-
dence. 
So far as Mr. Erwin is concerned the circumstan-
tial evidence on agreement is a follows : 
1. The witness Kempner testified that as he went 
with the witness ·Stubeck (and this is •all denied by Stu-
book) while Stubeck collected money from various per-
sons in poo1 halls and at certain card games Stubeek 
told Kempner that he, Stubeck, collected the money and 
took it over to Ben Harmon who split it ''with Erwin 
and his crowd" (787). 
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2. The witness 0. B. Record testified that Mr. 
Pearce had told him that the mayor wanted a collection 
nllade. 
3. The witnesses Smith, Early, Pricharu and 
Runzler testified that Mr. Er,vin had been infomned by 
then1 or others that a pay-off was being .conducted. No 
one testified as to the existence of any ~agreement. 
4. The 'vitness Hunsaker testified that Mr. Er,vin 
paid him in ·currency on a note Mr. Erwin o'ved Mr. 
Hunsaker; took receipts for this currency; sometimes 
paid by check or money order, and made payments to 
M·rs. Hunsaker, her son, Clifford Huns1aker, and at least 
once to a Miss Stone. 
Houses ·of prostitution have been operat,ed in Salt 
I jake City since long before January 6, 1936, and sub-
s·equent to January 1, 1938, .and prostitutes f.or many 
years have been, were and are being periodically ex-
amined (once every two we-eks) to ~ascertain if they are 
diseased, allJd, if they are not, they go back to their 
weHknown houses and practice p:vostitution. 
I_jot,teries, dice gan1·es, slot machines, bookmaking 
anEl other games of chance had operated in the city since 
prior to 1913 with f.eV\r, if any, molestations. 
If this case is not decided on the questions of l'aw, 
as we think it should, we apprehend the court will read 
the five volumes of reeord. The facts will further ap-
pear as we proceed. 
STATEMEN·T OF ERRORS RELIED UP·ON 
1. Failure of the court to quash the indi·ct-
ment. (Assignments 1 & 5). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
•> Insufficit:•nt accusation contained in the 
inilictment. ( ~\~~ig1llllen v~ 2, 4 & 6). 
3. Failure of the court to require the state 
to elect 'Yhieh ~nibdiYi~ion of 103-11-1 R. S. 1933 
it would proceed under (Assignment 6). 
4. Fajlure of the court to grant appellant's 
motion for non suit and dismissal. (Astsign-
ment 7). 
5. Failure of the court to gTant appell1ant's 
motion for a directed \ermct. (As·signment 8). 
6. 'T·hat the verdict is against and not sup-
ported by the evidence. (Assignments 10 & 18). 
7. Failure of the court to grant a.pp·ellant 
a fair trial (Assignments 9, 11, 12, 13 & 19). 
8. The oourt received incompetent, irrele-
vant a.nd immaterial evidence. (Assignments 14 
& 15). 
9. The court gave improper instructions to 
jury. (Assignments 17 & 24). 
10. The court failed to properly instruct 
the jury (Assignment 20). 
11. Failure of the oourt to gmnt the mo-
tion in arrest of judgment. (Assignment 21). 
12. Failure of the court to grant appel-
lant's motion for a new trial (Assignment 22). 
STATEMENT OF P ARTICUI.JAR Q·UES-
TIONS INV~OLVED 
I. The copy of the indictment returned by 
the grand jury and furnished defendant pursuant 
to the requirements· o.f Section 12, Ar1jcle I. of 
the Constitution of Utah, and 105-5-8 (2) R. S. 
1933 did not, and does not contain the nature and 
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caus~e of tthe 18JCcusation against him. :The indict-
ment cannot be cured by a bill of particulars. 
II. Insufficiency of the evidence to support 
thH verdict of the jury. 
III. Erroneous ~admissions of evidence. 
IV. ·The instrnetionis of the court were such 
as. to p·ermit the jury to s.pe-culate on its ver-
dict. 
V. Appellant's reques~ted instructions 
should have be~en grr-anted in the particulars here-
inaf,ter set out. 
VI. Appellant was placed twice in jeopar-
dy for the s~ame o.ffens:e. 
VII. Improper ~conduct of district attor-
ney. 
ARGUMENT 
IN~SUFFl!CIENCY ·OF IND·IOT·MENT 
I. 
Under Section 12, Article I. of the Constitution of 
Utah, and 105-1-8 (2) R. S. 1933, the accused is guar-
anteed the right to demand the nature and oause of the 
accusation against him, and to have supplied to him a 
copy of the indictment contairning such accusa.tion. 
At the first opportunity .availaib~e to him after the 
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grand jury returned its indiet.Inent, appellant n1oved to 
quash the indictment on nutuerou~ grounrds, (roo. 8, ab. 
±) one of "~hich grounds "~n ~ that it did not allege 
facts ""hich shlnY~i the naturl~ and ea use of the accusa-
tion against him as is gnaTantee-d and required by the 
aforementioned eonstitutiona1 and statutory provisions. 
(This statute ·was not repealed by the Code of Criminal 
Proc-edure adopted in 1935, nor by Chapter 143, Laws 
of lTtah 1931, <>r by any other amendment or statute). 
The motion to quash the indictment "~as denied. 
Defendant thereupon "~as required to plead to the in-
dictment. The indictment as returned by the grand jury 
-was obviously insufficient and inadequate. Acting under 
the coercion of the circumstances and without in any 
manner waiving his motion to quash, Mr. Erwin de-
manded a bill of particrnars. 
The insufficiency of the indictment as returned by 
the grand jury was conceded by the court and tby the 
state. It \\as wholly inadequate and insufficient to re-
quire defendants to plead. For that reason the ·court 
granted defendants' request for a bill of particulars 
and required the state to furnish 'a bill 
particularizing upon the all'eged means employed 
by the defendants to permit, allow, assist and 
enable hous-es of ill fame, lotteries, dice games, 
slot machines and various gambling devices and 
games of chance to he opev.ated and. maintained 
-at various places in Salt Lake City ; and I shall 
further require the State to particularize in re-
~spect to the location of the houses of ill fame re-
ferred to in the indictment and in the overt act 
·s~t forth in the indictment, and the names of the 
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ope,rrutors ·of those VJarious houses of ill fame 
referred to. I Sihall further require the State to 
particularize in resp·ect to the location of and the 
10pe~rators of rthe lottery ~estalblishmenJts and 
the dice game e·stablishments and the bookmak-
ing ·establishments, and. in respect to the oper-
a tors of the slot machines, and ~also to particu-
larize, if they intend to rely upon other games 
of chance ·or gambling devices, as t·o what those 
gambling devices are and who operate them and 
where they are mainfained in Salt Lake City. 
I .s:hall further require the State to particu-
larize. in respect to the location of the various 
houses of ill fame, and the operators thereof 
from whom allegedly ·money 'vas ·collected, and 
who ·colle-cted it, if anyone, and the same in re-
~spect to the location of and the operators of 
the various lotteries, diee games, slot machines 
and bookmaking e·stablishments referred to in 
the indictment. ( Rec. 37, 1a.b. 6) 
Thereupon a bill of particulars was furnished by 
Marion G. Ron1ney, Deputy District Attorney (Rec. 39, 
Ab. 7). 
. The bill of particulars contains the names and ·ad-
dresses of fourteen operators of houses of ill fame; 
the names and addresses of five opera tors of lotter-
ies ; the names 1a.nd addresses of three operators of dice 
games; the names and addresses of six bookmaking es-
tahlishnle:n ts ; and the names and addresses of ten 
places where poker games were kept, maintained and 
operated. (Poker games are not mentioned in the in-
dictment). 'T1he deputy district attorney, and nO't the 
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grand jurors, interprett"d th~ Janguag·p of the inrd,ict-
ment • '18D.d other gan1bling dPYiee~ and p;a1nes of 
chanc-e'' to mean pokt"r g·nme~. 
The bill of particular5 then nllege~ ( nb. 10) that 
the defendants 
permitted~ allo"'"ed, a~5i5lte·d, and enc.vbled houses 
of ill fame. resorted. to for purposes of prostitu-
tion and lewdness. lotteries, dice games, slot ma-
chines, bookmaking and other games of chance 
and oth-er gambling devices to be kept, main-
tained and opera.ted at the places herein m·en-
tioned in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, by then and there failing and re-
fu.sin.g to nu1.ke arrests for the keeping, mwin-
tain-ing, and operating of said places, although 
the said defendants he·rein well knew that said 
places zcere being kept, maintained and oper-
ated =~= * * and said defendants further permit-
ted, allowed, assisted and enabled said places to 
be kept, maintained and operated by failing and 
refusing to enforce the statutes of the State of 
Utah Olfl,d the ordinances of Salt Lake City pro-
hibiting the keeping, maintaining and operat-
ing of said places and said games. 
The deputy district attorney then alleges in the 
bill. of particulars that the defendants 
with the aid and assistance of Golden Holt and 
Ben Harmon, collected money from the ope,r-
ators of the houses of ill fame * * * 
and that the ·defendants : 
with the aid and assistanee of Ben Harmon, and 
other persons to the State of U~tah unknown, col-
lected money from the operators of the lotte·ries, 
dice games, ibookmaking, and other games of 
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·chance and gambling devices herein referred~ to 
.and set out. (It was. under the ·above words. ''and 
other g1ames of chance and ·gambling devices" 
that the ·court let in all of the evidence concern-
ing poker games. Poker games are not men-
'tioned in: the· indictment.) 
T.hereupon, motions were mtade 'by each defendant 
to quash the indictment as supplemented by the bill of 
parti·culars upon all of the .grounds of .the previous 
~otions to quash .and upon the further grounds: (1) 
that the hill ·of particmlars did not conform to the 
court's order, ( 2) that the indictment returned by the 
grand jury cannot be .supplemented or augmented by 
a bill of particulars furnished by the deputy district 
attorney, and on other grounds contained. in said mo-
tions~. ( Re·c. 42, a h. 11) 
Motions were made to strike the bill of particulars 
and after they were denied the defendants Erwin 
and Pearce· pleaded ''not guilty'' .and ''former jeop-
ardy and ta,cquitta[". (Rec. 59, alb. 13). 
INDICT1ME·NT D·EFINE(D 
''An indictment is an accusation in writing 
presented iby a ·Grand Jury to the· District 
Court, charging ;a person with a public off·ense·. '' 
105-10-2 R .. s. 19'33. 
If the indictment as returned by the grand jury 
had :contained the nature and the cause of the accusa-
tion against the defendant as required by the Constitu-
tiop. and the statute, the defendant would not have been 
entitled to ta bill of particulars, ex·cept, perhaps, to make 
it more cert·ain. 
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The trial court and the state proceeded on the 
theory that Ch. 118, St"\C\ 1, La"·s of Ut-ah 1n:~5 (105-21-
9) appliett to an indictm~nt returned by n g·rand jury. 
"\\ e confess that the la11g:uagt:~ -of the statute includes 
indictments. but obYiously the statute could not amend 
the constitution and it "'"as not intended to. Just as 
obnously the grand jurors must return the indictment 
and no one else. 
The above menti{)ned section of the 1935 laws pro-
-rides that when the indictment 
fails to inform the defendant of the particulars 
of ·the offense, sufficiently to enable him to prH-
pare his defense, or to give him such information 
as he is entitled to under the Constitution of this 
State, the court may, of its own motion, .and shall 
at the request of the defendant, order the pros-
ecuting attorney .to furnish a bill of particulars 
containing such information as 1nay be necessary 
for these purposes; * * * . 
It cannot be said that the grand jurors found that the 
defendants, "permitted, allowed, assisted, and enabled" 
the houses of ill fame and lotteries, !bookmaking estab-
lishments and poker games referred to in the bill of par-
ticulars to be kept, maintained and operated by fali"Wn.g 
and refusing to make arrests for the keepimk, maitntain-
ing and operating of said places because, for the simple 
reason, no one knows, except the grand jurors, what 
places and what reasons the grand jurors had in mind 
when they returned the indictment filed in this case. 
The grand jurors never fo}llld that Golden Holt 
and Ben Harmon collected money from operators of 
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houses of ill fame nor that Ben Harmon assisted the 
defendants to collect money from the operators of the 
gambling place·s. It was the <leputy district attorney who 
found those alleged facts. This defendant is entitled 
to .an indictment returned by a grand jury which gives 
the nature and cause of the accusation without resort-
ing to amy paper or docu1nent or bill of particulars fur-
nished by sorneone else. 
Who ean say that when the grand juror~s used the 
words "and other g,amibling devices and games of 
chance" they meant "poker games" which had been 
played at the places and under the operators named in 
the bill of particul!ars. The 1nention of the particular 
.r;ambli.ng devicPs excludes card games. : 
T~he <1eput~~ diRtrict attorney .after setting out the 
lotteries, dice ga1nes, bookmaking establishments and 
poker gan1es he had in his 1nind uses the words ''and 
other games of ·chance and gambling devices'' so that 
notvvithstanding he has named. the poker games, some-
one else .may come along and under that sort of lan-
guage include other game·s of chance and gambling de-
vices. See last t\vo paragraphs of bill of particulars. 
T:he language of our constitutional 1and statutory 
provisions concerning the requirements of an indict-
nlent has received judicial determination in many eases. 
A ·defendant is entitled to demand that the indictment 
charge the essential facts so specifically that the judg-
ment rHndered \vill be a -complete 1defensH to a second 
prosecution for the same offense. 
In the case of U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 
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L. Ed. 5SS, in diseu~sing- an indichnl\nt for crilniua 1 
conspiracy. the court stated ns follo\\Ts: 
According to the Yie·\\T we take- of thos·e 
oounts the question is not 'Yhe-thl\r it is enough, 
in ·~neral, to deseribe a. statutory offense in. the 
language of the statute, but "Thether the offens·e 
has here ibeen described at all. The ~tatute pro-
vides for the puni~hment of those .\vho conspire 
• ·To injure, oppress. threaten or intimidate any 
citizen, mth intent to preYent Or hinder his free 
exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege 
granted or sreured to him by the Constitution 
or laws of the l~ nited States.'' These counts· in 
the indictment charge, in substance, that the in-
tent in this case ''as to 'hinder anJCL prevent 
these citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment 
of · 'e\ery, each, all and singular'' the rights 
granted them by the Constitution, etc. 'Thel"e is 
no specification of any particular right. The 
language is broad enough to cover ;aJl. 
In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws 
of the "Cnited States, the accused has the consti-
tutional right ''to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation. '' Amend. VI. In 
"G. S. v. Mills, 7 Pet. 142, this was construed to 
mean, that the indictment must set forth the of-
fense ''with clearness and all neces~sary certain-
ty, to apprise the accused of the crime with 
which he stands charged;" and in U. '8. v. Cook, 
17 Wall. 174, 21 L. ed. 539, that "Every ingre-
dient of which the offense is composed mus;t be 
accur.ately and clearly alleged." It is an ele-
mentary principle . of ·criminal pleading, that 
· where the definition of an1 offens:e, whether it he 
'at common law or by :statute, ''includes generic 
terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment 
shall charge the offense in the same gen·eric terms 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
as i!Ill the definition; but it mus:t state the spe·cies; 
it must ·des(~end to particulars .. ' ' 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. 
and Pl. 291. ·The· object of the indictment is, first, 
to furnish the accus,ed with such a description 
of the charge against him as. will enruhle him to 
make his defens.e, and 1avail himBelf of his con-
viction or acquittal for protecti~on, against a fur-
ther pros·eeution for the same cause; and, s·ec-
ond, to inform :the court of the facts :alleged, so 
that it may decide whe·the~r they are sufficient in 
}.aw to support a ·conviction, if one should he 
had. For this., :fa;cts· are· to be s:tated, not conclu-
sionls of law alone. A crime is made up of oots 
and intent; and thes'e must he s·et forth in the 
indictment, with reaS'onahle p.aTticularity of time, 
place anld ·circumstances. 
Likewise, Justi·ce Field in the case of U. '8. v. Hess, 
124 U. S. 483, 31 L. Ed. 516, stated as follows: 
The doctrine invoked by the solicitor-gooie-r-
a!, that it is :sufficient, in an indictment upon a 
s~tatute, to set forth the offens-e in the wo:r.ds of 
the statute, does not me·ert the· ·difficulty he-re. 
Undoubt.edly the lan:guage of the statute may 
be used in the general des:cription o.f an offense·; 
but it must be aceomp.ani'ed with ~such a state·ment 
of the facts and circumstance's as will inform 
the .accus.ed of the specific offens'e, ·coming under 
the ge,neral deseription, with which he is eh:arged. 
,One- or two ·cas'ers will se.rve 1as an illustration of 
the ,doctrine. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U. ·S. 542, the ·counts ·of the indictment in general 
languagH ·charged the defendant'S with an intent 
to ihinder l3.nd prevent ·di ti~ens 1of1the U ni tedl States 
of African des-cent named therein, in the free ex-
ercise and enjoyment of all t·he rights., privileges, 
and immnnitie's, .and pr·oteotion goo.nted and se-
cured to them :r:espective,Iy as citizens of the 
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lTnited States and of the State of Louisiana, 
because they "-erP persons of Afrie.an descent, 
but did not specify a.ny particular right, the en-
joyment of "-hich the conspirators intended to 
hinder or preYl)ut: and. it 'vas held .that the 
aYernnents of the counts "-ere too Vla.gue and 
general, and lacked the certainty and precision 
required by the esbahlished rules of criminal 
pleading, and "·ere there-fore insufficien1t in law. 
In speaking of the necessity of g-reater particu-
larity of statem~nt, the court said, p. 558: "It 
is an e lement.ary principle of criminal pleading 
that where the definition of an ~offense, whether 
it be at common la"- or by statute, inclules gen-
eric terms, it is not sufficient thlat the indictment 
shall charge the offense in the same generic terms 
as in the de:finitio'lll; but it must state the ~spe­
cies; it must descend to particulars. 1 .Arch. Cr. 
Pr. & Pl. 291. The object of the indictment is: 
First, to furnish the accused with such a descrip-
tion of th charge agminst him as will enable him 
to m.a.ke his defense, amd avail hi1nself of his con-
v,ictio'n' or acquittal fo,r protection against a fur-
ther prosecution for the same cause; and sec-
and, to inform the court of the facts alleged, 
so that it may decide whether they are sufficient 
in law to swpport a conviction, if one should be 
;had. For this, facts are to be stated, not conclu-
silOns of law aloTIJe. A crime is made up of acts 
and intent; and these must be set forth in the 
indictment with reasonaJble particularity of 
time, place .and circumstances. 
Justice Sanborn, in the case of Fontana v. United 
States, 262 Fed. 283, says : 
The basic principle of English and Ameri-
can jurisprudence is that no man shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process ·of law; 'and notice of the charge or claim 
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against hin1, not only sufficient to inform him 
that there is. a charge or claim, but ISO distinct 
and spe·cific as cl,ea.r ly to advise him what he has 
to meet, and to gi VJe him a fair and reasonable 
oppor~tunity ~to prepare ·his defens,e, is an indis-
pensabl~e ·element of that process. When one is 
itn1dicted for a serious o If ense, the presumption 
is that he is irvnocen.t thereof, and consequently 
that he is ignorant of the facts on which the 
pleader founds his charges, and it is a funda-
mental rule that the sufficiency of a;n indichnent 
rnust be tested on the preswmption that the de-
fendant is inrnocent of it and has no knowledge 
of the facts charged against him in the pleading. 
MiHer v. Unit~ed State·s, 133 IPed. 337, 341, 66 C. 
C. A. 399, 403; N,aftzger v. Unjted Srtates, 200 
Fed. 494, 502, 118 C. C. A. 598, 604. 
It is essential to the sufficiency of an indict-
'ntent that it set forth the facts which the plead-
er clai1ns constitute the alleged transgression, 
so distinctly as to a;dvise the accused of the 
charge which he has to 1neet, and to give hi1n 
a fair opportunity to prepare his defense, so 
particularly as to enable hi1n to avail himself of 
a conviction or acquittal in defense of another 
prosecution for the same offense, am;~d so cle,atrly 
that the court ma.y be able to determine whether 
or not the facts there stated are sufficient to 
support a conviction. United States v. Britton, 
107 U. S. 665, 669, 670, 2 ~sup. ~Ct. 512, 27 L. Ed. 
520; United Sta~t·es v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 488, 8 
Sup. ·Ct. 571, 31 I.J. Ed. 516; Miller v. United 
S·tartes, 133 Fed. 337, 341, 66 C. C. A. 399, 403; 
Armour Pkg. Co. v. United .St·ates, 153 Fed. 1, 
16, 17; 82 C. C. A. 13-5, 150, 151 14 L. R. A. (N. 
S.} 400 ; Etheredge v. United ~states, 186 Fed. 
434, 108 C. C. A. 3-56; Winters v. United States, 
201 Fed. 845, 848, 120 C. C. A. 175, 178; Horn v. 
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United States. 182 Fed. 7~1, 72~, 105 C. C. A. 
163, 167. 
In I.~ynch Y. l~nitPd Sba.te~. 10 Fed. (~d) 9~7, the 
court held as follo,vs: 
The defendant in a criminal 0nst), in view 
of his presumed innoce'nc.e, is not only -entitled 
to know from the statements of the indictment 
what facts the prosecution considers sufficient to 
make him guilty of the offense charged, with 
reason31ble partcularity, so that he may procure 
witnesses and make proper defense thereto, but 
he is also entitled to denza-nd that the indictment 
charge the essent·ial facts so specifically tha~t the 
judgment rendered zcill be a complete defense to 
a second p·rosecu.t-ion for the same offense. 
I'"nited States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 8 S. Ct. 571, 
31 L. Ed. 516; ArmQur Packing Oo. v. United 
States, 153 F. 1, 82 C. C. A. 135, 14 L. R. A. (N. 
S.) 400; Floren v. United States, 186 F. 961, 108 
C. C. A. 577. 
See also Goldberg v. United States, 277 Fed. 211. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of State v. 
Topham, 123 Pac. 888, 41 Utah 39, held as follows : 
The doctrine is fundamental, and, as stated 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 16 Sup. Ot. 
434, 40 L. Ed. 606, that " the constitutional right 
of a defcendant to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him entitles him 
to insist, at the 'Outset, by demurrer or by mo-
tion to quash, and after verdict, by motion in 
arrest of judgment, that the indictment 'Shall 
apprise him of the crime charged, with such rea-
sonable certainty that he can make his defense 
and protect himself after judgment agairnst an-
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other prosecution for the same offense;" and by 
Mr. JuSttice Sanborn in Floren v. United 'Btates, 
186 F·ed. 961, 108 C. C. A. 577, that "On a motion 
in arrest of judgment, a.s well 1as. on a demurrer, 
it ~s essential to the va.lidity of an indictment that 
it contain averments of the facts which consti-
tute the offense it charges so certain and specific 
that upon conviction. or acquittal thereon it, and 
the judgrnent upon it, will constitute a complete 
defense to a second prosecution of the defend-
ant for the same o If ens e." Many ·cases in support 
of this !doctrine· are there cited. 
It is also e.Jrementary and, a,s stated iby the 
Miehi~an court in Preople v. Marion, 28 Mich. 
257, appl'loved and quoted by this -court in State 
v. M·cKenna, 24 Utah, 317, 67 Pac. 815, that, "as 
every man is presumed to he innoeent until 
proved to he guilty, he must be presumed also 
to be ignorant of what is intended to be proved 
against him, except as he is informed by the in-
dicement or ilnformation. '' These doctri;Illes are 
not he:re· disputed. Our s-tatute is in harmony 
with them. 
In State v. Lund, 75 Utah 559, 286 Pac. 960, dis-
cussing the sufficiency of an information -covering a 
statute very similar to the statute uporn which the charge 
in this case is founded this -court held: 
It ·will he observed that various. acts are de-
clared ·to he felonires tbry ·the p·rovisions of Sec-
tion 8097, and that diffe.rent penalties are· pro-
vided fior a violation of the- va:ri~ous provisions of 
that se·ction. T1here is no alle·ga.tion of any fact 
in the information here under revie-w which makes 
dirHet and certain any one- of the- erim·es. defined 
in ~that s;e·ct.ion. It necess,a.rily follows that the 
information is fatally defective. 'This ·eonclusion 
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finds support in the follo,v-ing: cases decided by 
this court: State Y. Mcl(enna., 24 Utah, 317, 67 
P. S15: Stat€! Y. ~Topham, 41 Utal1, 39, 123 P. 888; 
State Y. Ges:as, 49 r:tah 181, 162 P. 366; State v. 
Steele, 67 Utah, 1, 2-!3 P. ~~32; Sta h_} v. Hale 
(Utah) 263 P. 86. 
From the ea~es cited aboYe it i~ apparent that un-
der our constitution the object of an indictment is two-
fold: It n1ust. first. furnish the accused 1citlt such a de-
scripti.on of the char,qe agai nsf him as trill enable hi'Yn 
to make his defense, and_. second. it nzust be specific 
eno·ugh to aL·ail hinz of the right upon conviction or ac-
quittal to protect him a-gainst a further prosecution 
for the sanze offense. Even though it is true that certain 
crimes may be charged in the words of the statute such 
d{)es not apply to statutes where the crime is defined 
in general and generic terms. 
It is clear from the reading of the statute pleaded 
that if ·a perst>n were charged in the terms of the stat-
ute he would not kn{nv what sort of a conspi:rtacy he was 
charged with, nor if tried for a conspiracy would never 
be able to plead the same as a bar to a similar charge 
made after either ~a conviction or acquittal. 
THE INDICTME~TT WAS NOT AND C·OULD NOT 
BE CURIDD BY THE BILL OF P ARTI·CULARS 
The nature and cause of the accusation must ibe 
contained within the four corners of the indictment. 
~he deputy district attorney had no authority to as-
sume to state or to specify the particulars of the of-
fense ~the grand jury intended to charge. No .statement 
he might make is binding ~as of record on ·a plea of for-
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mer jeopardy. He has no power or control or right to 
change the substance of the indictment. 
An indictment {~;an be round only on the concur-
rence of :at least. five grand jurors. 105-20-1, R. S. 1933. 
When so found it must be endorsed as a true bill. 
The endorsement must be ~igned by the foreman of 
the gT.and jury. 
The grand jury must be ·Constitutionally formed 
and must .act as provided for in the constitution (Art. 
1, Sec. 13). 
BILL OF PARTICULARS NOT A PART OF T·HE 
INDI,CT:MENT 
In State vs. Solomam, 93 Utah 70, 71 P!ac. (2d) 104, 
this court held that a bill of particul1a.rs is not a part of 
the information or indictment. In s~tate vs .. Jessup------
Utah , 100 Pac. (2d) 969, the court held: 
:K'**The function of a bill of particulars is 
not that of (~ompelling the· ·defens:e to aid ~the 
pros1ecution in stating a cause of ~action. The 
burden of stating such .a ea.use re's·ts upon the 
shoulders of the prose·cution, ~and until it is. stat-
ed to the extent required by our simple form of 
criminal pleading·, the question of whether or 
not a bill of particul·ars isi prerequisite to further 
action on behalf of the accus~ed, has not ·arisen. 
Wright v. People (Colo.), 91 Pac. (2d) 499: 
The offense set out i;n the hill of p~articulars 
appears to he obtaining money :and warrants by 
means of false pretenses. It is fundlam·ental that 
a de£endant can be- tried only on ~the- charge con-
tained in the indictment, a.Illd not for any other 
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an ·i·nd·icftne·nt or i·nfornlafion, nor an a·mend·nte·nt 
the,reto. The S'Ole offic~ of tlH"\ bill of particulaJ~s 
is to gi\""e tht~ a.dYer~t"\ party infornllati.on 'vllich 
the pleadings, by reason of their generality, do 
not give. • $ • It ca:nnot chanpe the offense 
charged, n.or in a:ny lcay aid an 'ind,ictment 
fund.anze-ntally bad, although it may remove an 
objection upon the ground of uncertainty.'' 31 
C. J. 752, 753; United St·ates Y. :TUJbbs-, D. C., 94 
F. 356; May '· United States, 8 Cir., 199 F. 53-
61. 
People '·Westrup (TIL), 25 K. E. (2d) 16: 
Hozce~·er, the indictment, and not the bill of 
particulars, i.s the ch01rge upon which the defend-
ant was tried. The only Qbject of the bill of par-
ticulars is to give the defendant notice of the 
charge against him and to inform him ·of the 
particular transactions brought in question so 
that he may be prepared to make his defense. 
McDonald v. People, 126 lll., 150, 18 N. E. 817, 9 
Am. St. Rep. 547. Its ·effect, thereforoe, is to 
limit the evidence to the transactions set out in 
the bill of particulars. The prosecution, however, 
is not required to set out all the evidence it will 
produce. The object of a bill of particulars is 
not to make a subs.tan tial charge against the de-
fendant, but to limit the evidence which may be 
introduced under the indictment to particular 
transactions. The indictment, which is the 
charge, can neither be helped n~or hurt by the bill 
of particulars. People v. Depew, 237 Ill. 574, 86 
N. E. 1090. 
United States v. Lynch, 11 Fed. (2d) 298: 
***Hence all of the averments necess1ary to 
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charge an offense must he included and pre-
sented by that body, (grand jury) and the dis-
trict attorney would he without power to supply 
any such essentials by 1amendment or through 
the medium of a bill of particulars, 31 C. J. p. 
650, and authorities in footnote·s. 
Jarl v. United States, 19 Fed. (2d) 891, at page 894: 
A charge may he good 'and yet it may be 
made to appear that in fairne·ss the defendant 
should be furnished with ·additional information 
to prevent surprise, I"HS1triet the proof and thus 
enable him to make reaso:nable p·reparration for 
hirs defense. It cannot be used to cu-re a;n indict-
ment fatally defective. Furthermore, we do not 
know on wha.t rea.son, or by what authority a 
District Attorney cam assume to specify the 
particular offense the grand jury intends to 
charge, nor do we believe a.ny statement he n~ight 
make in that respect toould be binding as of rec-
ord on a plea of former jeopardy. He has no 
power of control or right to ch(JJ}1)ge the action 
of that body. There are cases in which tha.t prac-
tice is appropriate, but the indictmernit must be 
good on its face; and that procedure cawnot be 
resorted to, with or without the request of de-
fendant, to amend an indictment which is bad 
because of a larck of precision, certainly ood ac-
curacy in charging the o If ens e. This, we think, is 
the plain meaning of the ~authoriti,es that have 
been ·Ci't'ed, whether the offenser was known at 
common law or only statutory and whether it be 
a fe~·ony or only :a misd~emeanor. The .reason and 
necessity £or the rule apply ra:s much ~to the one 
as to the ot·her. The- root's of the· principle ·are 
in the eommorn law and we find them imbedded 
in the Cons·titution. 
S·bate vs. Gilbert (N. H.) 194 Atl. 728. The defend-
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ant ,ya.~ chargt"\d "·ith rt'ekle~~ driYing and t hP cbarg·p 
"-as merely ~t.ated in g-eneral h\rn1~ of the ~tatute. The 
court held: 
N-or can the d.eft'Ct be cured by permitting 
the ~tate to file a ibill of particulars for the so-
licitor may not speak for the Grand Jury a;ny 
more than he 1nay an1eud an indicfrnent. See 
State Y~. Kelly, 66 X. H. 571, 380, 29 A. 843 and 
ca5es cited. 
See ·al5o the follo,,ing cases : 
Thomas YS. State of Maryland, 197 Atl. 296. 
Smith \S. State (Florida) 112 .So. 70. 
State Ys. Wadford, (N.C.) 139 S. E. 608. 
State \S. Gilbert (X. H.) 194 Atl. 728. 
10 A. L. R. 982. 
Thr~ court ordered the district attorney to furnish 
to the defendants the means employed by the defendr-
an:ts to enable the houses of Yice to be operated. That 
could not be ~ascertained from the indictment. In re-
sponse to that, the deputy district attorney alleged 
that the defendants enable-d houses of vice to be oper-
ated by refusing to make arrests ~and by refusing to 
enforce the la \YS of the State -of Utah and the ordlin-
ances of Salt Lake City (Ab. 10). 
Does that constitute the nature ~and cause of the 
accuS'ation? The grand jury did not so state. Maybe 
the gi"a.nd jury found that the defendants. furnished 
the facilities which enabled the houses of vice to op-
erate; or furnished the operators of these house:s of 
vice money, fixtures, buildings and customers. Arnd, 
there is no allegation or proof that houses of vice would 
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not continue to be operated even if arrests had been 
made. The proof is that prostitution is earried on a.t the 
named houses of prostitution and if prostitutes are 
driven from those houses, they seatter over the city. 
ThJa,t is so, also, of ·card gan1es ·and poker games and 
other games. of ehance where a lot of par.aphernalia 
is not needed. That is so of !bookmaking. 
The bill of particulars said that collections. we1, 
1nade with the aid ·and assistance of Golden Holt and 
Ben Ha.rmon and other persons unknown to the· deputy 
district attorney (Ab. 11). 'The gDand jury did not so 
find. And ~this defendant is to be tried on an accusation 
of the grand jury. 
NO OVERT ACT ALLE·GED 
The statute alleged to have been violated: 
103-11-1, R. S. 1933. 
If two or move persons ·oonspire : ( 1) . . . . 
(2) ... (3) ... ( 4) ... ( 5) to -commit any act in-
jurious . . . . to public morals,, . . . . or for the 
p·erversion or obstruction of justice or the rdue 
administration of the la\YS ;-they arH' punishable 
by imp·risonme:n!t in the eounty jail not ·exceeding 
one year, or by :fi:ne not exceeding $1,000. 
No agreement am·ounts to .a conspiracy unless sotne 
act is performed by one of the parties to the agree-
Inent, which act effeCJts the objeet of the· ,a.greement. 
103-11-3, R. S. 1933. 
No agreement . . . amounts to a eonspiracy, 
unless some act, besides such agreement, is done 
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the parti~~ to such agreement. 
Upon a trial for conspiraey such a~ is sought io be 
alleoo-ed in thi~ c.ase the defendant eannot be convicted, 
unless one or more OYert art~ are e:\."'J)ressly alleged in 
the indictment and proYed. 
10,- ')·1 11 R ~ 19·"l·"l u-u-- . .. ~ . ~~. 
Upon a trial for conspirncy in a cas·e whel'1e 
an O\ert a.ct is nec-essary to constitute the of-
fense, the defendant ~shall not ibe convicted, un-
less one or m<>re <>vert acts are ·expressly al-
leged in the . . . indictment, nor unless one of 
the acts alleged has been proved; . . . 
An overt act is an act done by one or more of the 
conspif"ators to effect the object of the agreement. It 
must be separate and apa~ from the 1agreement and in 
addition to the agreement. 
The overt acts sought to be alleged are : 
1 and 2: That the the def·endants permitted 
houses of vice to be ~operated. 
3 and 4: That the defendants collected money 
from operators of houses of vice. 
The first and second overt acts are not ,overt acts 
·at all. If anything, they are a part of the agreement. 
The agreement is : 
The defendants did agree 
to permit (houses of 
vice) tu operate. 
The first two overt acts 
1are: 
The defendants permit-
ted houses of vice to op-
erate. 
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The first two overt acis clearly :set forth the same 
acts that are alleged to have constituted the agreem·ent. 
'The last two overt acts in no way show that money 
was ·colle~eted for the purpose of carrying out and with 
the intent to ·carry out the 1agreemernt. 
The ease of People v. Hines, 6· N. Y. Sup. (2d), 2, 
168 Mise. 453, diseussing the ques~tion of overt acts 
states: 
A number ~of ~aHeg,a:tions are re·cited in the 
indictment under the heading ''Overt Acts.'' 'The 
only one's affecting defendant Hines are .two 
.contained in paragraph 15. ·One is to the effect 
that in March, 1932, he met with other;s and 
conferred up·on 'and dd.rsrcussed plans to influernce, 
intimidate and bribe judicial ~offieers. The other 
is that :at the s1ame time he reeeived $1,000 in 
cash fflom Dutch Sehultz, one of the eonspirat~ 
ors. The first "overt act" is really a part of the 
conspiracy looking toward action in the future 
and is not properly an overt act. The receipt by 
Hines of a payment of $1,000 ~cash, aftthough al-
leged as .an overt act, i's not such, but som·ething 
done as a part of the agreement to cemernt the 
eonsp1racy. 
United States v. Gros:sman, 55 Fed. (2d) 408: 
The overt act must be entirely independent 
of the conspiracy. It must not 1he one of the se-
ries of aets -constituting the agreement, but it 
.mus't be a subs·equent indepenCLent :act following 
a complete agree;mHnt or conspiracy, 1and done 
to ·carry into ·effe~ct the object of the original 
agreement. 
Marino v. United States, 91 Fed. (2d) 691: 
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The crim-e is completed "·hen nn overt act 
effe-ct the objer.t of tllf' conspiracy is done hy at 
least one of the conspirator~. An overt· 
act is s-omething apart fron1 the conspiracy, amd 
is ''an a.ct to effect the object 'Of the conspiracy.'' 
Joplin Mercantile Co.'· United States, 236 U. S. 
531, 535, 35 S. Ct. 291, 293, 59 L. Ed. 705. It 
need be neither a criminal a.ct, nor .the very crime 
that is the obj.ect of the conspiracy. It mus:t, 
h-owe\er, aooompa.n~~ or -follow the agreement, 
and must be done in furtherance of the object 
of it. 
The third and fourth alleged overt 'acts-that the 
defendants collected money from operators of houses 
of vice, are not acts "done to effect the object (of the 
~~eement) by-otze or more of the pa-rties to such agree-
'ment. '' To collect money from houses of vice does not 
enable such houses of vice to operate. If it did, the 
more money collected from operators of house of vice 
the ibetter enabled such operators would be to operate. 
It can't be said thtat to collect money by way of 
taxes, tribute, fines or other impositions enables houses 
of ill fame to operate. 
The state is put in this position. For thirty years 
these houses of vice have been opemting. They could 
not operate unless collections were made from their 
opemtors. Therefore, for thirty years collections have 
been made. The state changec11ts theory when it filed its 
bill of particulars and, abandomng its alleged overt acts, 
took the position that the houses of vice were enabled to 
operate because defendants failed and refused to make 
arrests. But there is no ~allegation or proof that, the 
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£ailure to make arrests· is the thing that enables. houses 
of vice to operate. If tha,t were so, it would be simple 
to rid the ·city of houses ·of vice and it is known from 
the record in this case and the court has judicial knowl-
edge that houses of vice are not so e1asily suppressed. 
The Ht:ate was required to prove an wet done by one 
or more of the alleged conspirators to effect the object 
of an agreement proved to have been entered into iby 
this defendant. 'T·he only money collected was collected 
by Abe Stubeck (774 a:nd 787) .and Golden Holt (970). 
This money was delivered to Abe Rosenblum (967); 
someone in the Mint c~afe (787); Ben Harmon (937); 
and on. one occasion ~1r. Holt gave approximately 
$500.00 to Mr. P·earce in the presence of Mr. Harmon. 
at .a time \\rhen Mr. Pearce was Mr. Harmon's attor-
ney (Rec. 738)). 
There is no proof that any of the money eollected 
ever got into the 'hands of Mr. Erwin and there is no 
competent evidence from which it ~can be deduced that 
any .such n1oney got into his hands. This will be dis-
cusHed in greater detail under the neading of the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence. 
II. 
INSUF·FICIE·N,CY OF EVID~iNiC·E TO :SUPPORT 
VERIDiiCT 
So far as Mr. Erwin is concerned the corpus delicti 
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in this case is an agreement bet,veen hin1 and •one or more 
named ()r referrPd to co-conspirators plus at least one 
of the alleged overt acts (if said acts are in truth overt 
acts) done to effect the object of the agree1nent b~J one 
or m.ore of the parties to suck agt·eement. 
The evidence is not sufficient unless it proves an 
agreement to commit the offense between Mr. Erwin 
and ()De or more of the following: (1) Mr. Finch, (2) 
Mr. Thacker, (3) Mr. Pearce, (4) Mr. Harmon, (5) Mr. 
Stubeck, (6) Mr. Holt; and unless the evidence in ad-
dition to the proof of such agreement, proves an act 
(which has ooen alleged) done to effect the object of 
the agreement by one or 'mOre of the parties to such 
agreement. It isn't .sufficient that an overt act be 
proved. It isn't sufficient that the agreement and an 
overt act he pro\ed. It isn't sufficient that the agreement 
·and one of the overt a-cts alleged in the indictment (if 
they are overt acts) be proved. 
The state must prove '3-n agreement of Mr. Erwin 
with one or more of the parties named to commit the 
offense denounced by the statute ·an<t in addition the-re-
to must show an overt act (which has been alleged) 
done to effect the obj·oots of the ·agreement by one or 
more of the parties to such agreement. 
;The agreement alleged in the indictment is an 
agreement between Mr. Erwin, Mr. Finch, Mr. T:h~ker, 
Mr. Pearce and Mr. Harmon ''together with divers 
other persons to this grand jury unkn()wn''. The agree-
ment was entered into ''on the 6th day of Jan nary, 1936, 
and on divers other days and times between that day 
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and the lst day of January, 1938". The tagreement was 
''to ·commit acts injurious to p·ublic morals and for the 
perversion and obstructio~n of justice and the due ad-
ministration of the laws of the .state of Utah." 
The agreement was "to permit, allow, assist tand 
enable house·s of ill fame . . . and lotteries, dice games, 
slot machines, book-making and other gambling devices 
:and games of ·chance (card or poker games are not men-
tioned in the indictment) to he kept, maintained and op-
erated at various places in Salt Lake City, .... " The 
defendants ' ' then and there well knowing that said 
houses of ill fame, lotteries, dice games, slot machines, 
bookmaking and other gambling devices and games of 
·chance, were being kept, maintained and -operated .... ''. 
'There is no direct evidence of any agreement. If 
·there is any evidence of sueh an 'agreement it is circum-
stanti'al. By an analy.siB of the te:S'timony of each wit-
ness whose testimony in any wise affected Mr. Erwin, 
we will demonstrate that there w·a:s no dire-ct, cir·cum-
stan,tial or other evidence that he (or for that matter, 
any other defendant) entered into any agreement to 
commit ;any offense much less an agreement to commit 
the offense· alleged. 
The eorpus delicti cannot he p:roved hy a confes-
sion, admission or de·claration alone. You must 'put your 
~hand over any alleged confession or admission or ooc-
laration and then see if there is aa1y independent evi-
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dene.e proving the corpu~ delicti. Sta.te v~. J o1mson, 
95 Utah ;)7~. 83 Pac. (~d) 1010. 
The corpus delicti i~ the body of t hl~ c. rime. Proof 
of the corpus delicti is essential to a c.onviction. It must 
be pro,·ed beyond a reasonablt:\ doubt, and must ex-
clude every hypotheses other than that a. crime was com-
mitted in order to c.onvict. 
·The author of Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 
Third Edition. Page 33, in discussing confessions and 
admissions to pro\e the corpus delicti says: 
A \obmtary confession or admission of the 
accused is not sufficient to prove the ,corpus delic-
ti unless there is other evidence in proof thereof 
either direct or circumstantial; or, as it is fre-
quently decided, a confession or admission by the 
accused to prove the corpus delicti must be ''cor-
roborated". The "corroboration" of a confes-
sion or admission which is required in order to 
prove the corpus delicti refer not merely to facts 
proring the confession but to facts concerning 
the corpus delicti, or evidence independent of the 
confession. The corroboration of a confession 
does not necessarily prove the corpus delicti. The 
other evidence required to establish the corpus 
delicti in addition to that furnished by the con-
fession need not be wholly independent on the 
confession, and it need not connect the defend-
ant with the crime. The corpus delicti may be es-
tablished by the confession of the .acoosed to-
gether with corroboratin.g circumstances. Where 
the evidenoo is :sufficient to show that the crime 
has ibeen committed, or where there is any evi-
dence dehors the confession in proof of the cor-
pus delicti, the confession or admission is admis-
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sible. A ·confession together with proof of the 
·corpus ·delicti m~y sustai'l1 ·a conviction, but an 
extfla..:judici'al confession alone will not sustain 
a eonvi~ction. An extra-judicial confession is sup-
p·orted by proof of the ·corpus d·elicti where the 
evidence of both together p~roduces a conviction 
-of guilt. 
11 American Juris·prndence 57 4: 
Declarations of an alleged conspirator are 
not admissible against ·a co-conspirator in the 
absence of evid;ence from which may be inferred 
the l1atter's assent jointly with the other con-
spirators to the existe~~ce and execution of the 
conspiracy within the statutory period of limita-
tion, unless the statements are made in the pres-
ence of those against whom they are offered. 
* * * 
WITNES:SES 
The state called 26 witnesses. ·Of these witnesses 
-one was Agus.ta Friend, whose evidence was strickern 
(901). 
Four of the 26 witnesses were prostitutes, Alder, 
Carlton, Newman and C·ollins. ·One of these four, Col-
lins ( 902), c~aimed her privilege and did not testify as 
to what her business was (910). Three testified that 
they had paid money to Mr. Holt. One of the three testi-
fied .she· gave him an ovel'lcoat. They all testified. that 
they had been engaged in prostitution in this city for 
many yetars prior to January 6, 1936, and sirn·ce the 1st 
day of January, 1938, and up to the time of the trial 
(932), (914), (9·42). ·There cannot be any dispute but 
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that house~ of ill fame operated in this eity long- before 
.and long aft~r the above dah'~ (Holt's testituony 1030). 
Prtl~titnt.~~. generally, \vere atTP8ted 1nonthly or 
semi-monthly, booked at the police ~ta.tion, examined for 
venereal diseases. If found to be ·'clean'' were dis-
charged to go back to their \Yell-known houses of ill 
fame, and if found to be di~eased kept until they were 
cured (1033). 
Three of the witnesses \\~ere reformed gamblers,-
Goslin (54±), Hayes ( 821). Scott ( 677 et seq.). The 
proof is that gambling such as mentioned in the indict-
ment was carried on in Salt Lake long prior to and 
after the dates mentioned in the indictment. There is 
nothing in the evidence of any of these witnesses which 
in the remotest degree connects the defendant Mr. Er-
win (or for that matter any other defendant, with any 
agreement or with the commission of any overt act, 
nor is it claimed that any of these witnesses was a co-
conspirator. 
The witness Ellett's testimony (1264) and the wit-
ness Headman's testimony (1497) do not affect this 
defendant. If it affects any defendant, it was Mr. Thack-
er, who was acquitted. The witness Lewis's testimony 
(967) does not affect this defendant. If it affected any-
body, it affected Mr. Thacker who was ;acquitted. The 
witness Kesler testified merely as to the quantity of 
proof it took to prove the offense of bookmaking 
(2018). 
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'The above dis·poses of twelve witnesses. There are 
fourteen remaining. Of these one, Weiler, was ·called to 
prove the likelihood of Mr. Erwin agreeing with Mr. 
Pearce to commit a crime by showing that on one oc-
·Casion while the witness was acting as :a deputy county 
clerk in 1936, Mr.· Pearce a·cted as attorney in a case 
filed in the City Court in 1934, and called Mr. Erwin 
as a witness in a case in which he was not a party 
(1243). 
The wi tnes:s, Mis~s M·cDon:ald, ·City Recorder, testi-
fied that Mr. Erwin was sworn in as Mayor of Salt 
Lake City the first Monday in January, 1936 (378); 
that he resigne·d February 7, 1939 (378); that Mr. 
Finch was discharged as Chief -of Police January 21, 
1938 ( 379). While she was on the ~stand eity ordinamces 
were introduced, one showing that the Ci t.y Board of 
Health had control of prostitution (444). 
0. B. Reeord testified (149·9) that he had been In-
spector of Police for three years, and concernillg cer-
tain arrests in ·certain gambling houses.; that he was 
next in line to the ~Chief of Police; that in the absence 
of the Chief of Police, Mr. Thacker did not report to 
Mr. Record. Hi~s testimorny seems not to be directed to· 
W1ard Mr. Erwin. If it involved anyone, it involved Mr. 
T~ha~cker who was acquitted. 
The testin1ony of the witness Hoagland ( 2025) was 
not directed to the defendant Erwin. 
·The above four witnesses did not testify as. to 
any agreement, nor as to the commission of any overt 
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act in furtherance of any agreement. The testimony 
of the remaining ten witnesses is claimed by the state 
to affect the defendant Mr. _Erwin. 
We now proc.eed to a close analysis of the testi-
mony of these 'Yitnesses. ·The testimony of one is not 
in any sense related to the testimony of the other, so 
we will not take them in the order in w'hich they were 
sworn, nor the order in which they testified. 
The testimony of the mtnes.se.s Smith (492), E·arly 
(460), lrrs. Runzler (1~52) and Prichard (1107) goes 
to the proposition that Mr. Erwin's attention was called 
·to the existence of a former Qr present underworld pay-
off in Salt Lake City. 
MR. AcSTIK SMITH 
Mr. Smith had ibeen appointed Mr. Erwin's secre-
tary on January 6, 1936 (492). Shortly after Mr. Finch's 
appointment and -at his invitation, Mr. Smith visited Mr. 
Finch at his home (493). Mr. Smith received a memor-
andum in the first part of June, 1936 ( 497) .and in the 
absence ·of Mr. Erwin left it on his desk (513). This 
memorandum contained a list of supposed p.ayoffs in 
town. The last place the witness ever saw the memor-
andum was on Mr. Erwin's desk (499). Mr. Smith hand-
~ the memorandum to Mr. Erwin and Mr. Erwin 
said it would be immediately investigated; that he 
did not know .anything about it ( 500). (All of this tes-
timony was objected to and motions were made to 
strike it on -all conceivable grounds). 
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At the witne·ss Holt's request, the witness Smith 
met Mr. Holt in Captain Taggart's office in the Fed-
eral Building (501). This occurred some time in June, 
1936. Two days after that, Mr. ,S,mith had a conversa-
tion with Mr. Erwin in hi~s office. Mr. Smith told Mr. 
Erwin tha~t he, Smith, had had ;a conversation with an 
1mnamed p·arty who knew conditions first hand (503). 
Mr. Smith told Mr. Erwin that there was a payoff go-
ing on; that there were vice ~conditions that were be-
ing talked about all up and down the street. Mr. Er-
'vin informed Mr. Smith that it would, be thoroughly 
investigated. Two d:ay.s .afterwards, Mr. Smith met Mr. 
Erwin and Mr. Finch and Mr. Holt in the Public Safe-
ty Building (504). On the day of this eonversation and 
before the meeting in the Pulblic Safety Building Mr. 
Sn1ith met Mr. Erwin at Mr. Er\vin 's office. Mr. Erwin 
appeared to be very upset, and told Mr. Smith that 
he, ·S.mith, ~should not be talki'llg to the people he had 
talked to pertaining to the department .and. Mr. Erwin's 
particular affairs ( 506). During the ·conversation in 
Mr. Finch's office in the Public Safety Building, Mr. 
Holt stated that there were vice conditions and that 
Mr. Holt had called 'Mr. Smith to Mr. ·Taggart's office to 
inform him so that he, S:mith, could tell Mr. Erwin 
(507). When asked to state what Mr. Holt meant by 
"vi·ce conditions" Mr. Smith testified that there was a 
payoff .going on from houses of p~rostitution and ~am­
bling houses. Mr. ·Smith w·as reprimanded for going 
over in the enemy's camp and washing out dirty linen 
(508). 
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On cross examinntion Mr. Smith testified, that he 
had not given the memor~mdum to Mr. Erwin but in 
the absence -of Mr. Er,Yin he had left it on Mr. Erwin's 
d~k and that he, Mr. Smith, had never seen the mem-
orandum after that time (513). The memorandum was 
not signed by Mr. Smith (514). 
No\\, the most that can lbe said of this testimony 
is that Mr. Holt a police officer, had· told Mr. Smith 
that there \\as a payoff; that somebody had given Mr. 
Smith a memorandum containing approximately the 
same informati011, which memorandum was unsigned 
and in the absence of ~Ir. Erwin was plaood on his desk 
and \\as never thereafter seen, and that Mr. Holt re-
peated to :Mr. Erwin in the presence of Mr. :Finch that 
there was such a payoff. The testimony is that several 
times lrr. Erwin said the matter would be thoroughly 
investigated. This does not constitute any evidence of 
the agreement, nor of the commission of any ov-ert act 
done to affect the object of any agreement by any one 
or more of the parties to the agreement as is required 
by 103-11-3 R. 8.1933. 
MR. JOHNS. EARLY 
About January 8, 1936, Mr. Early was appointed 
by the City Commission as Office Manager, Public Safe-
ty iDepartment of Salt Lake ·City (499). Mr. Erwin 
talked. to Mr. Early about this position after he, Mr. 
Erwin, had lbeen assigned to the Department of Public 
;Safety. Mr. Erwin stated to the witness that he had 
heard that there w;as a payoff (466). Mr. Erwin 
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asked, Mr. Early to get all of the information he could 
with reference to it (467). Later on, Mr. Early told Mr. 
Erwin. that he had discussed the matter with numer-
ous officers. and had been unable to get any informa-
tion whatever from t'hem ( 468). He told Mr. Erwin that 
from 1another source he had learned that there was a 
payoff of $2,000 per month from prostitution and gam-
bling houses ( 469). He was not .asked for any reply 
from Mr. Erwin but 21 pages further in the record the 
witness testified that he told Mr. Erwin there were 
rumors that there was. a vice p~ayoff and that Mr. Er-
win said that the· entire matter was in the jurisdi;ction 
of the Chief of Police. That Wias as near as the witness 
could, recollect the statement ( 485). Later on, he told 
l\ir. Er\vin again that he had heard rumors of a vice 
payoff ( 486). The 'vitness was then asked if in these 
conversations 'vith Mr. Erwin the witness. had men-
tioned that lVIr. Finch and Mr. E.rwin were involved 
( 487). The witness said, ''No'' ( 488). Thereupon, the 
proHecuting attorney "\vas permitted to eross e:x!amine 
the witness over objection and finally, to the same ques-
tion, Mr. Early answered, ''Yes, I did tell him that, 
that I had advised them that I heard that they were 
involved, that there were such rumovs around.'' When 
a'Sked what 1\Ir. Erwin said, Mr. Early testified, "1 
can '.t recall his exact words, but he dis·claimed all 
kno\\rledge of it, of course, both him and Mr. Finch.'' 
( 490). Thereupon the witness was ex·cused. 
·There is nothing in Mr. Early's testimony which 
proves or tends to prove any agreement or the com-
mi,ssion of any overt act or \vhich constitutes an ad-
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mission or a confession or is in a11y sense compe-
tent or releYmlt unless pr1-or or subst\quent to the re-
ceipt of such testinlPny the corpus delicti is proved. 
MRS. W. T. R.lTNSLER 
Mrs. Runsler tes.tifie-d that early in 1937, she and 
Mrs. Earl 'Tan Cott and Mrs. Lee \Yright called on Mr. 
Erwin at his office in the City and County Building. 
Mrs. Runsler was State Director, Salt Lake City Dis-
trict, 1; tah Federaition of \V omen '·s Clubs ( 1253). In 
this oonversation lrrs. , ... an Cott stated that accorditng 
to information she h.ad received Mr. Erwin was receiv-
ing a payoff of $750.00 a month, the chief $350.00 and 
other operators $250.00. Mrs. Runsler testified that 
when this statement was made Mr. Erwin flushed con-
siderably and stated, '' Oh, I am accused of that too, 
am I-?" (1257) Then ~fr. Erwin took a cigarette and 
asked if he might smoke and changed the sufb~ect 
(1258). 'l'his does not constitute evidence of agreement 
or of the doing of one of the overt acts ·and does. not 
constitute an admission that l\Ir. Erwin was receiving 
the $750.00 per month payoff. It \vas not received by 
the court as -an admission. Mrs. Runsler simply Sttated 
that Mrs. Van Cott stated that according to informa-
tion she had received such a;nd such were the facts. 
'This was not an accusation made by Mrs. Van Coit that 
what she had heard was true. She m~ght have smiling-
ly said, ''I have heard that you are participating in a 
payoff.'' The very form of her question might have 
led him to believe that she, Mrs. Van Cott, did not be-
lieve the rumor. The point is, ·no one had accused him 
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of any offense and this alleg·ed "payoff" was not in 
.any sense identified. No man, espe·cially a public of-
:fi.cer, is ·called upon to constantly deny every rumor of 
which he is informed. And if he doesn't deny it, his 
failur-e cannot be cons1trued to he an admis·sion. Nor 
can his failure be construed to be evidence of an agree-
ment or the commission of an overt act. 
MR. A. M. PRIC:HARD 
T·he witness Prichard testified that he was the city 
sexton; that prior to that he had been a detective; 
that he frequently met Mr. Erwin in his office· where 
he !brought plants from the cemetery. In the fall of 
1936, he had a ·conversation with Mr. Er,vin (1108) irn 
which he told Mr. Erwin that there was a payoff in 
town and the women's organization of Salt Lake City 
had .a list of all the payoffs, the names of the parties 
paying off, the- amount they were paying off, and tihey 
were going to have a meeting about it (1108-A). Mr. 
Erwin and Mr. Prichard talked about this informa-
tion and Mr. Erwin asked Mr. Prichard if Mr. Prichard 
could .get Mr. Erwin a copy of the list and Mr. Prich-
.aDd said he would try (1109). 
About three days afterwar-ds, he returned and 
gave Mr. Erwin a list of the nam·es of the people that 
were supposed to be paying the payoff, their addresses, 
.and the a~mount they were paying. Mr. Erwin s.tated 
that it was unbelievable and from that day to the time 
of the trial the matter was never mentioned by Mr. 
E·rwin to Mr. Prichard (1110). The witness was ex-
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cused. 
This does not constitute evidence of an agreement 
or of the cormni~siou of an OVl'\I"t .act in furtherrunce 
of an agreement. It eertainly i~n 't an ad1nission. Mr. 
Erwin 'Ya~ not accused of taking· pa.rt of the money. 
He did not ~ay he 'Yould not inYestig·a.te it. He said 
it was lmbelieva.ble and put the paper in his desk. He 
vn1s not called upon to make any denial. He was not 
called upon to do anything other than "~hat he did do. 
Hanng done exactly what he did do, ho'v can it be 
said that that constitutes evidence of an agreement or 
of the commission of an overt aet in furtherance of any 
agreement. 
H.KRECORD 
:Mr. Record had Jbeen a police officer of Salt Lake 
City for fifteen years and in the early part of 1936 
was chief of the anti-vice squad (948). He testified that 
he visited :)lr. Pearce in his office in the Continental 
Bank Building and in the presence of Mr. Harmon Mr. 
Pearce told him that he, ~Ir. Pearce, was responsible 
for Mr. Record's appointment to the head of the vice 
squad "and that the mayor had instructed him to make 
collections from gambling houses and other forms of 
vice.'' T-hereupon, Mr. Record asked how much they 
wanted or expected to get and Mr. Pearce is alleged to 
have said, '' $1700 .a month.'' After talking about the 
sources of this money Mr. Record said that he wo.wd 
have nothing to do with it and Mr. P~-arce said, '~All 
\ ' 
right, we will get somebody else to handle it." (~5~) 
At this stage of the trial, no evidence of the corpus de-
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licti ·had been introduced, nor was any thereafter in-
trod~ced. It is ·claimed by the state that because Mr. 
Pearce used in this alleged eonversation the term 
''mayor'' that Mr. Er,vin is somehow bound lby the 
tes·timony as showing that Mr. Erwin w.as a party to 
·an agreement to make the ·collections referred to. iT·ak-
en in connection with other testimony in the reeord or 
taken alone and given the full force of anything that pos-
sibly can be ·claimed for it, it amounts to nothing so 
far as Mr. Erwin is ·concerned. From it, the jury could 
not possibly properly deduce that there was any agree-
ment or that any overt act had been committed, or that 
any {)Vert act would be ·Committed in furtherance of 
any agreen1ent. It should have been stricken as was 
strenuously argued by counseL 
1\IR. 1DAR KEMPNE.R 
Mr. Kempner testified that s-ome time during the 
months of April, May or June, 1937, he saw a Mr . 
. Stubeck. That early in the spring of 1937 (774) he ac-
companied Mr. :S,tuheck to certain pool halls and card 
rooms. Th·at at ·alhout 3 :00 o '·clock i'll the afternoon of 
that day (776) the witness and Mr. Stubeck went to 
248 ·South Main Street and Mr. ·Stubeck went up to a 
man "rho vras racking pool balls on the pool tables and 
asked that man if he had the money ready (779). (All 
of this testimony 'vas. strenuously objeeted, to by coun-
sel and in the mids·t of the objections the state an-
nounced that Mr. Stube·ck was one of the- conspirators 
( 780). The witness then testified that the man racking 
pool' 'balls said, "I haven "t quite got all of i·t." (782) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Whereupon, Mr. Stubec.k told hin1 bt\ had 1lH\tter gPt 
it in a hurry or he would know· the rf\~u l t ( 78~~). 'fhat 
man left the plaee and said he "Tould ht) ijlnek right 
away. When he returned he had ~orne enrrency in his 
hand. Thereupon, :Mr. Stnbeek ~aid, ''All right'', and 
put the money in his pocket. The ·witness and Mr. Stu-
beck then went to 2~~ South M.ain Street. The witness 
went to get a drink of coca cola, and Mr. Stubeck 
went into the card room. After he had been in the card 
room the two of them left. Thereupon, the prosecuting 
attorney asked the witne5s : 
'• Q. Then, after you got upstairs, did he 
say anything to you-?" (784) 
This \\as objected to and during the course of objec-
tions and argument, the court said, ''Of course, this is 
of importance. H it should develop that it isn't perti-
nent, I presume that it would be a mistrial. I am not 
saying that it would, lbut I presume it would. '' Where-
upon, the witness testified that Mr. Stubeck told him 
that all card games were paying off and that some of 
them were trying to chisel by giving him less money 
than they should. (786). The witness asked Mr. Stubeck 
who was paying off and Stubeck answered that all cal'ld 
clubs were paying off. The witness asked him 
who gets the money and the witness testified that Stu-
beck said, "Well, I take it over to Ben Harmon's plaee." 
Then ·the witness said,____ ''Well, does Ben Harmon 
get that money?' And the witness stated that StuJbeck 
said, '~Well, he splits it with Erwin and his crowd.'' 
(787) 
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. On what theory is this evidence competent or rele-
vant~ Up· to this point there has been no connection 
by Wtay of pleadrng or otherwise be·tween Mr. Erwin 
and Mr. Stuheck, or between Mr. Erwin and Mr. Har-
mon, except that Mr. Harmon is one of the defendants. 
We will hereafter discuss the question of whether 
or not Mr. Stubeck and Mr. Holt were co-conspirators. 
But for the time being suffice it to say that Mr. Erwin 
·can't be bound by this testimony unless it can fbe shown 
that Mr. Stubeck gave the money to Mr. Harmon and 
Mr. Harmon gave the money to Mr. Erwin pursuant 
to an agreement and under circumstances which charged 
Mr. E~rwin with knowledge of the source of this money. 
The testimony of Kempner is not evidence that Stubeck 
made any collections of money pursuant to an agree-
ment or that he paid it to Mr. Harmon pursuant to 
that agreement, or that Mr. Harmon paid it to Mr. Er-
win pursuant to that agreement. 
Twenty-two witnesses have now testified and there 
isn't a scintilla of evidence that any agreement was 
ever entered into or that any overt act was ever com-
mitted to effectuate such an agreement. 
MR. GOLDEN HOLT 
T·he prosecuting attorney early announced that he 
did not elaim !tfr. Holt wasn't a ·conspirator. He claimed 
that he was (93.2). Thereafter, he ·claimed that he was a 
co-1actor ( 973). 
Mr. Holt testified (962) that he had been a police 
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officer for uuu1y y~ars prior to 1 ~):H): that ltt\ had bPPn 
connected \Yith the auti-Yiet\ ~quad of the polieP depart-
Iuent and that in ~lnreh of 1D36 he \Ya~ appointed ehief 
of the anti-,ice squad by the rhi~f of police. He te~tified 
concerning the converBation to \Yhich the \Yitness ~1nith 
had previon~ly testified to the effect that he had heanl 
of a payoff (~166). He te~tified that later the chief told 
him to close everything up (~1l1~) and that he \\?ent around 
and did clo5e them up (969) and that they re1nained 
closed for about a month. 
He te~tified he had another conver~ation \Vith ~lr. Finch 
in the latter part of July~ 1~136, at \vhich conversation 
lir. Finch told ::Jir. Holt to see ~Ir. Rosenblun1 ( 660). 
That he sa\\- ~Ir. Rosenblum and Rosenbhnn told hin1 to 
go and collect from the women (970). ::Jir. Rosenblum 
told him the places that were operating and the an1ounts 
to collect from each place; that he did make collections 
from them and turned the money over to Jir. Rosenblu1n 
(971). He testified as to the amounts he collected from 
houses of prostitution ( 972). ~-1.t this point the district 
attorney claimed that the \vitness Holt was a conspirator 
(973). He testified that he had another conversation with 
the chief and the chief told him to let the places remain 
open but not let them run too openly (974) and that he 
just let them run (975). He testified that in January of 
1937, the chief told him to close everything up and that 
he was going to give the witness another man on the 
squad to see that there was absolutely no more payoff. 
He testified that he was removed from that position the 
first of ~{arch (976) and that H. K. Record took his 
place; that later he was put back on the vice squad 
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(977) ; that later ~1 r. Thacker told him to take charge of 
prostitution and that ~lr. Thacker would take charge of 
gambling. He testified that he had had a conference ·with 
Mr. Ben Haruton in J\;lay of 1937 at the Mint (982) and 
that Ben Harn1on told hin1 he wanted to collect from the 
places of prostitution (984) and that Ben Harmon told 
hirn the arnount that he would collect from each place 
( 985). The last collection \vas rnade the 1st day of Jan-
nary, 1938. Asked where he took the n1oney that he col-
lected in June, he testified he took it to Mr. Harmon and 
1\Tr. Harn1on told hin1 to take it to :1\tfr. Pearce's office 
(938). That was the 3rd or 4th of June, 1937. The wit-
ness went to Mr. Pearce's office and entered the lobby. 
1'Ir. Pearce told hin1 to con1e in which he did and laid 
the n1oney on the desk. l\1 r. I)earce picked the money 
up and put it in the dra\ver of the desk (1001). ~Ir. 
Har1non \vas sitting in a chair left of the desk. There 
\vas about $500.00 (1002). The \vitness testified that at 
a later conversation with 1fr. Harn1on, Mr. Harmon told 
hin1 that Mr. Pearce had accused the \Vitness of holding 
out on hin1 and \van ted the \vitness to go to Mr. Pearce ·s 
office and see hin1 ( 1004). The 'vitness went to Thfr. 
Pearce's office and was sho\vn a slip of paper with a 
list' of places on it ( 696). After they had talked a while 
1\fr. Pearce told the 'vitness that he thought the witness 
\vas doing a fine job ( 1005). 
On cross-exa1nination the \vitness testified that the 
chief told hin1 to bring the prostitutes in for examination 
as that was done in the past (1030). That the prosti-
tutes \Vere brought in about every two weeks. That where 
they could, they \Vould try to keep track of where the 
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girls were. That as the pro~titutt'~ c~une to hnvn, the 
witness 'vould find out "·ho tlu~y "'Pl'l' and ~PP thnt tht'Y 
were brought into the Board of Health. The poliee de.:. 
partment had their nalnt~~ and nddre~~P~. ThPy wPr<.~ 
booked on the book entitled · · Regi~ter of ... \.rrestf', Salt 
Lake City Corporation·' (10~~~). The pro~titutes \Vere 
handled the same ''ay during all the thne the "·itness was 
on the anti-nee squad (103:1). The 'vitne~s te~tified that 
he had been taking collections to ~\be Rosenblu1n until 
the 1st day of January. 1937 (1039). The 'vitness never 
reported any of these transactions to any officer, city 
attorney, or to anyone else until after the alleged. con-
spiracy had ended. The "Witness testified that J\fr. Finch 
said to him. ''I don't see "·hat has been done that could 
cause this talk about taking money from the underworld 
and about the department being tied up 'vith the under-
world.'' ...lnd the "Witness stated in reply, ''I don't know 
how anyone could have anything on you. You don't need 
to worry. I do not know of anything that involved you 
in this. '' ( 1046) 
During the period in question the witness testified 
that he was living at the ~Ioxum Hotel for a period of 
about sixteen or seventeen months (1069); that he had 
been divorced from his wife and was living apart from 
her. That he was driving an automobile and that he 
bought a lot of stock in the Dead Cedar Mining Company 
and the Lead Strike Mining Company. He invested in 
these stocks $300.00 on two different occasions in i937 
(1070),, and the money was paid in currency (1071). The 
witness made substantial investments in stock ( 1072), 
that the witness's salary as patrolman was between $155 
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to $165 a month (1077). That up to Septe1nber of 1938, 
the witness had never had a conversation with Mr. Erwin, 
had never associated with l\1 r. Erwin, was never present 
at any conversation or at any place when anyone else 
had a conversation with Mr. Erwin concerning any payoff 
or anything of that kind; that he never reported any 
vice conditions to nir. Erwin (1080). None of this tes-
timony in the slightest degree tends to prove directly 
or indirectly that ~fr. Erwin (or for that matter any 
other defendant) was a party to any agreen1ent or con-
spiracy as alleged, or other,vise or at all, or that he in 
any fashion participated \vith anyone to co1nmit any overt 
act to effect the purposes of any agreement. There isn't 
an admission, a declaration, a confession or any circum-
stances that can be tortured into proof of anything con-
necting Mr. Ervvin with the offense charged. 
MR. FISHER HARRIS 
Th1r. Harris testified that s1nce :Jiarch 13, 1932, he 
had been and that he still -vvas City Attorney for Salt 
Lake City (1288); that during the fall and \Vinter of 
1937 he made an investigation of vice conditions in the 
city and that as a result thereof prepared a letter \vhich 
he delivered to :n1r. Erwin on January 15, 1937 (1290). 
January 15th fell on Saturday. 
So far as Mr. Er,vin is concerned the highlights of 
Mr. Harris's testimony are: 
1. The letter of January 14, 1938 (Exhibit R). 
2. The conversations 1\Ir. Harris·had with Mr. 
Erwin at the City and C~unty Building. 
3. The conference at the Alta Club. 
4. Mr. Erwin's resignation. 
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The court w·ill not be ~atisfied \rith any di~en~~ion 
of his testiinony unle~s and until it rt\ad~ thP reeord .. It~ 
introduction "·a~ ~trennou~ly objeeh~d to on nll eoneeiv-
able grounds by all partie~ at all tinte~. In our di~en~­
sion of )[r. Harri~ \;;. te~ti1nony at thi~ tin1e wt\ p;ive 
full weight to "-hat he ~aid and expeet to den1on~trate 
that it dt)es not constitute proof (a) of the alleged agrPe-
ment. (b) of any overt art. (c) of any ad1nis~able (•onYPr-
sation. adrnission or declaration. 
THE LETTr:R 
The letter "-as not offered or receiYecl in evidence 
as an admission (1293). It \vas not offered to prove its 
contents (1296). 
It ''as not offered to sho\v that the things stated in 
the letter actually existed ( 1297). 
The district attorney exa1nined .Jir. Harris concern-
ing the contents of the letter ( 1291). The letter had not 
been offered in evidence ( 1293). 
The letter \Yas offered as Exhibit "R" ( 1295) for 
the purpose of showing the reaction of the former mayor 
as to this letter (1296). 
It \vas admitted for the purpose indicated (whatever 
that is), not as evidence of the things therein stated 
(1301). 
For the convenience of the Court we are producing 
this exhibit. It will be noted that the letter has been 
fastened together and unfast€ned at least three times; 
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that the first page was written· on one typewriter and the 
second page written on another type,vriter, that the first 
page is dated January 14, 1938 and the second page is 
dated January 12, 1938, with a 4 written over the 2. 
There is attached to the exhibit a slip of paper which 




SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
January 14, 1938. 
Hon. E. B. Er,vin, ~iayor, and 
Board of Commissioners, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Gen tle1nen : 
During the past several months rumors of 
corrupt alliance bet\veen officers and employees 
of the Department of Public Safety and operators 
of various illegal establishments in Salt Lake City 
have reached me with such frequency and from 
so n1any sources of apparent reliability that I 
found it to be my official duty to make an inde-
pendent investigation of their validity, and, hav-
ing made it, to inform you of the result. 
I have found the follo,ving in actual existence 
and operation : 
LOTTERIES: 
456 vV est 2nd South 
458 West 2nd South 
472 West 2nd South 
435 West 2nd South 
439 West Second South 
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DICE G-4-\.)[r~S: 
''T estern Soeial Clu l)-~~;) l~ 'y est ~nd South 
Zapeon Club-5G ,,~ e~t ~nd South 
POKER ft.\.~[E~S: 
Past Time Clu~)j En~t ~nd 8outh 
Bank Sn1oke Shop-58 En~t 2nd 8outh 
:llission Cigar Store-129 8outh )lain 
Peter Pan Card Club---2:22 South l\lain 
Horse Shoe Card Rooin--!9 East 2nd South 
~int Card Club-27 East 2nd South 
Wilson Card Room-32 East 2nd South 
BOOKlf..ll{ERS: 
Basement ..:\.tlas Bldg. 
Basement X ew Grand Hotel 
124 East 2nd South 
First Floor,"''~ oodruff Apts. 
K ewhouse Building 
Ron. E. B. Erwin-Page 2 Jan. 14, 19:38 
HOUSES OF PROSTITUTION: 
63% West 2nd South 
253 South West Temple 
143% West 3rd South 
133 West 3rd South 
143% East 2nd South 
128% West 1st South 
243% West 2nd South 
31 West 1st South 
36 East 4th South 
127% West 1st South 
123 West 3rd South 
255 South 1st West 
Piedmont Hotel-249% South State St. 
Rex Hotel-253 South State St. 
I have found that all of these exist, and have 
existed to the knowledge and with the connivance 
of the officers of the Police Department charged 
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with the duty of their suppression. 
I have found also that, with rare exceptions, 
no illegal activity in Salt Lake City is exempt fron1 
the payment of tribute; that those I have men-
tioned, with a few exceptions, pay each Inonth a 
previously agreed upon a1nount for the privilege 
of operating during that month. 
The persons who actually collect this tribute, 
and its amount, in each case are as well known to 
me as those \vho pay it, and it is known to me 
also to who1n it is ultimately distributed. 
You will notice that I say in each instance that 
''I have found,'' etc. By this I n1ean that I am not 
repeating run1ors or street gossip. I have related 
undeniable facts and facts of such public notoriety 
that to ascertain them required little more than 
the desire to do so. 
Very truly yours, 
( s) FISHER HARRIS, 
City Attorney.'' 
Apparently the letter \vas offered and received in 
connection \Vith a statement attributed to n1r. Er,vin-
' 'Why, I have never heard anything like this before,'' 
when it is claimed that he had heard all those things be-
fore (1504). After this letter \vas admitted it was re-
ferred to, read froin, discussed, handled, and then stricken 
as an exhibit but was left to remain in the record (1379 
and 1380). 
CONVERSATIONS 
The witness had two or three conversations with ~lr. 
Erwin at his office in the City and County Building. The 
contents of the letter were discussed and the penciled 
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mrunoranda on tl1e letter wt.\rt.\ nutde by ~I r. Er,vin. 
None of these conversation~ involvPd the n~e~~~ity of 1\lr. 
Er"·in 1uaking any denial~ or adinission~. He "·a~ not 
charged "ith taking any 1noney fro1n thP allt.)~Pd eollec-
tions and if the 'vitne~~ kne"· that ~Ir. Er,,·in ,,·a~ re-
ceiring such n1oney he did not di~eu~~ the fact \vith 
~Ir. Er"in. 
COXFEREXCE ~\T ~\LT-6.-\. CLUB 
This conference occurret l on January 201 1938. Mr. 
Fish1 connected with the Salt Lake Telegra1n, had in-
vited ~Ir. Bourn and :Jir. Heal. connected with the Salt 
Lake Tribune. llr. HarTis. :Jlr. Finch and 1Ir. Erw"in·to 
take luncheon at the Alta Club on that date ( 1360). ~I r. 
Harris purposely did not attend the luncheon until after 
the other parties had finished eating ( 1360). The "·itness 
was requested to state the con\ersa tion had in the pres-
ence of these men (1360). The evidence \Vas admitted 
as against ~Iessrs. Er"in and Finch only (1361). 
The witness stated that :Jir. Fish said that they. had 
heard rumors of an investigati<Jn being made in regard 
to underworld activities and in regard to official corrup-
tion and he demanded to know what it "yas all about. 
The "·itness answered that he had 1nade a cornplete 
report of the matter to :Jir .. Er,,·in, in writing. In re-
sponse to an investigation to do so, the \vitness enumer-
ated them (1361). The 'vitne:-:s enurnerated the amount 
of each kind of activity paid. Whereupon, Mr. Fish said: 
"Do you know who gets this money and to whom is it 
finally distributed?'' ( 1362), a:nd the witness said that he 
did and then Mr. Fish said: "Who~" The witness said: 
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''E. B. Erwin gets $750 per 1nonth. Harry Finch gets 
$500.00 per month. The amount collected.'' The witness 
said that Mr. Erwin was about five and one-half feet dis-
tant from him at the time the state1nent was made and 
that neither Mr. Erwin nor ~1r. Finch said anything 
( 1362). 
On cross examination, ~1:r. Harris testified that the 
gentle1nen present had been invited to the luncheon; that 
the luncheon was served on a rectangular shaped table, 
something the shape of the counsel table in the court 
roo1n (1407), the long way was east and west. Mr. Erwin 
sat on the west end of the table and l\1r. Fish on the east 
end of the table and \vhen ~lr. Harris came in he sat at 
~1r. ~.,ish's right. ~lr. Finch was directly across from 
~Jr. Harris. l\ir. Bourn \vas at his right and l\1:r. Heal 
\vas seated at Mr. Er,vin 's right on the west end of the 
table (1407). 
The \vitness testified that he dre"\v a piece of paper 
fron1 his pocket and wrote some figure on it and 'vas 
doing what he called "doodling." l\1r. Fish may have 
asked 'vho got the money before the \vitness \Vrote the 
figures on the paper (1407). 
Thereupon, the following occurred: 
Q. (by l\fr. l\1usser) Now, as a result of 
that, l\Ir. Harris, your testimony in the other case 
-as you recall, didn't you write :this on this 
piece of paper and just show it to Mr. Fish at 
your left~ 
A. I rather believe I did. I believe I did 
sho'v l\fr. Fish that piece of paper if that is 'vhat 
you are asking. 
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Q. Ye~. that is exaetly "'hat .. .:\nd that paper 
had on it the figures 7 ;)o in one plnef~ and 2;)0 
in another place·? 
.. .:\... 250 you ~a y. 
Q. '\'Va~ it 250 or 500! 
A. 500. 
Q. X ow. shortly after that the n1eeting broke 
up, did it not! 
A. Well, ~oon after it broke up, yes. ( 1408) 
Mr. Erwin'~ failure to make any reply to )Ir. Harris's 
statement does not constitute an admission that an agree-
ment ''as entered into or that an overt act was com-
mitted. The occ-asion was at a luncheon party at 'vhich Mr. 
Erwin and the other gentlemen "-ere the guests of Mr. 
Fish and nothing is stated as to what occurred prior to the 
time Mr. Harris entered into the conversation. 
There is no showing that )Ir. Erwin heard the state-
ment. The statement \\as probably not made. 
If he did hear it he was under no obligation to reply 
to it under the circumstances of the occasion. 
And his failure to reply to it does not constitute 
any admission, declaration or confession. 
MR. ERWI~'S RESIGNATION 
Mr. Harris testified that on January 26, 1938, Mr. 
Erwin's attorney, Mr. Stewart, handed him, Mr. Harris, 
a resignation signed by Mr. Erwin. That was marked 
Exhibit '' S'' and was offered and received in evidence 
(1367). That at a later date l\1r. Erwin sent the City 
Commission another resignation, which was marked Ex-
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hi bit '' T '' and \vas pffered and received In evidence 
(1372). 
The witness testified that he demanded the second 
resignation fro m~1r. J~r,vin (1378). These \Vere not offer-
ed or received on any theory that they tended to prove the 
agreeinent or that they tended to prove any of the overt 
acts and they \Vere \vholly iininaterial until the corpus 
delicti had been proved. 
The 1notion to strike should have been granted. 
MR. BEN HUNSAKER, AND 
MR. CLIFFORD HUNSAKER 
·The testimony of these two witnesses will be con-
sidered together. The court \viii not be satisfied \vith 
this testin1ony without reading the record. 
Ben Hunsaker \vas interested in a corporation sell-
ing automobiles, kno\vn as the Gate\vay Chevrolet, Inc. 
Mr. Erwin joined in this undertaking in 1932 and put 
into the business about $1,000 ( 1145). 
The Gateway Chevrolet, Inc. became indebted to 
Ben Hunsaker for $18,500 incurred before 1\{r. Erwin be-
came connected with the Company. This \Vas represented 
by a note ( 1145). The note \Vas finally paid do\vn to 
$10,000 ( 1146). Thereafter and on or about l\farch 23, 
1936, Mr. Er\vin individually signed a note in favor of 
:n1r. Hunsaker for the $10,000 and agreed to pay. it at 
the' ·rate of $200 per month out of Mr. Erwin's salary 
(1119} .. 
Ben Hunsaker and Clifford Hunsaker came down to ! . 
Sal~ ·Lake to get the note signed and met Mr. Erwin in 
I • 
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his office in the City and l't)unty Building nnd after di~­
cnssing the note and "·ithout furth~r adiPu lh\n tllUl~h kPr 
said that he \Yanted 1r r .. Er\Yi.n to pay the notP out nf hi~ 
~alary and not out of graft-that ~Jr. 11~r,rin had h~Pn 
crooked, but that he \\·antt:\d hin1 to go straight front 
then on {lllS). 
Thereafter the "itne~~ te~tified to nu1n~rou~ l'()fl-
Yersations had behYeen hun and J[r. Er,rin. Hi~ son. 
Clifford, testified that he "~as present at the ti1ue ~! r. 
Erwin signed the note and kne"- that the note \YH~ to be 
paid out of Mr. Er"in ·s salary. 
Thereafter :llr. Er,,-in 1nade Inany pa~~nent:s on t~1e 
note in question, one \Yas n1ade by check: one \Yas by 
\Yes tern Union money order: seven \\·ere made to Ben 
Hunsaker in currency for "-hich receipt:s ,,~ere given: 
six were made to :Jirs. Hunsaker, for "~hich receipts "rere 
given; three "·ere made to Clifford Hunsaker, for ,,-hich 
receipts were given and one '"-a=' made to Dorothy Stone, 
for which a receipt \Vas given. 
Ben Hunsaker testified that on the occasions when 
money was paid to him and on one or two other occasions 
1Ir. Erwin stated that (a) he had his chief of police and 
m~ney was coming in, (b) that he. \van ted the department 
of finance because he said he would make plenty of money, 
(c) that they couldn't catch him hecause he didn't do 
the collecting, (d) that they couldn't catch the ch~ef of 
police because he didn't do any collecting, (e) that they 
had the ·woinen lined up, ( f} that he paid the money in 
currency so that the banks wouldn't know his business, 
(g) that he was glad Ben Hunsaker 'vas not making an 
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income tax report of it because he didn't want to, etc. 
None of this testimony was admissable unless the 
agreement and an overt act had been proved or was to 
be proved. 
No inference can be drawn from it that Mr. Erwin 
agreed with anybody to do the things alleged in the in-
dictment or referred to in the bill of particulars. They 
do not arnount to conversations, declarations or admis-
sions. The fact that he made payments in currency is 
not proof that he did not come into possession of the 
money legally or that if he came into possession of the 
rnoney illegally he got it from houses of vice in Salt Lake 
City. 
It is significant to note that Ben Hunsaker accepted 
these payments without complaint and 'vithout notifying 
anybody of his receipt of them or of his suspicions with 
respect to them. 
The court will read with interest the threatening let-
ters and telegrams sent by Ben Hunsaker to Mr. Erwin, 
exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. It 'vill also read with 
interest the letter sent by Mr. Lo,ve to Mr. Stewart, 
(defendants' exhibit 22) in 'vhich Mr. Lowe states that 
the letter is being dictated in the presence of Mr. Hun-
saker. Mr. Hunsaker admits it (1177). They state "The 
mayor is a good n1an and we want to assist hirn in main-
taining his high standing in Salt Lake." 
Now, this letter 'vas written January 12, 1938, al-
rnost t'vo years after the conference held in the mayor's 
office in March of 1936, and after all of the ''slimy stuff'' 
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Ben Hunsaker had testified to a~ having oeen rred in the 
meantime. 
In this same letter they al~o 8aid tl1n.t they had tal1H_\d 
the difficulty over ·'and ",.bile the runount ~hould be paid 
and probably would be paid if suit "·ere filed, "·e both 
nevertheless want to help the n1ayor and are Yery loathe 
to see him embarrassed.:-· 
This concludes the State's case. 
The court instructed the jury that there \Yas no suf-
fi.cient direct or positive evidence that the defendants, or 
any of them, with each other, or other"\\;se, actually met 
or came together or expressly agreed to commit or pursue 
any common design or purpose or to commit or do any 
of the things or matters alleged in the indictment. (In-
struction Xo. 7, Abs. 264.) 
Now, what circumstantial evidence was there to 
prove the charges! 
No witness testified as to any conversation between 
or amongst or with respect to any of the defendants con-
cerning any agreement. 
No one paid any money to :\:{r. Erwin. No one paid 
any money to anyone else with instructions to deliver it 
to Mr. Erwin. No person who collected money from 
houses of vice told the operators that the money was for 
Arfr. Erwin. No person who paid money was told that if 
he paid it he could continue to operate his establishment. 
There is no evidence of the reason why operators 
of pool halls and card games paid money to the witness 
Stubeck, except the bald statement of the witness Kemp-
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ner (denied by Stu beck) that Stu beck told Kempner that 
there was a pay-off. There is no proof that any paJinents 
to Stubeck constituted a pay-off. If these operators did 
pay the witness Stubeck rnoney and if Stubeck said that 
this 1noney vlas paid for protection, that does not prove 
any agreement or conspiracy, nor does it prove any one 
of the overt acts. 
The witness Holt never testified that he made any 
collection at the instance of l\1r. Erwin or that he paid 
any money to anyone to be turned over to ~1r. Erwin 
(he certainly kept the overcoat that the prostitute Sadie 
Alder gave hiin). 
Disregarding Stu beck's denial and giving weight to 
the. fantastic testimony of Ken1pner, collections fro1n 
houses of vice \vere n1ade only by Stubeck and Holt. The 
money Stu beck collected \Vas put on the cashier's desk 
at the l\iint Cafe. 
The 1noney Holt eollected, \vhich was not kept by 
him, was turned over to: (1) Abe Rosenblum, who was 
not even designated by the State or the Court as being 
a co-actor or a co-conspirator; ( 2) Ben Harrnon, ·who is 
now dead and with whom Mr. Erwin was not even ac-
quainted; ( 3) l\fr. Pearce, the attorney for Mr. Harmon, 
and in the presence of l\fr. Harmon. 
The only way the State can possibly connect any of 
this money with Mr. Erwin is by \Yay of confessions, 
admissions or declarations. 
When Mr. Erwin replied to nfrs. \:ran Cott: "Oh! 
they're accusing 111e of that, too, are they?", he did not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63 
thereby 1nake an ad1uission that ean be eon8trlH.'d n~ any 
proof of the eorpns delicti in thi~ ensP. 
\\~hen he said to :Jl r. Harris with rP~pt:~et to the lPt-
ter (Exhibit R): '·I hnYt' neYt'r heard of sueh things. It 
is unbelievable,·' he did not thert\hy 1nakP any 8ueh ad-
llllSSlOll. 
\\~hen he did not reply t\l the ~tate1nent by :Jl r. Harris 
at the Alta Club (if he heard the staten1ent). he did not 
thereby confess or admit or declare that he "·as a party 
to an agreement to permit house~ of Yice to operate in 
Salt Lake City or that he had actually rereiYed such 
money. 
\\~hen :Jir. Erwin told Ben Hunsaker the things Ben 
Hlmsaker testified to, he did not thereby confess, ad1nit 
or declare that he \Yas a party to a conspiracy to per1nit 
houses of vice to be operated in Salt Lake City or that 
he was receiving any monies collected fro1n such places 
by the witne~ses Holt and Stubeck. 
So far as applicable and in support of his conten-
tions, ~Ir. Erwin adopts the argument contained in the 
brief filed in this cause on behalf of :Jfessrs. Pearce and 
... 
Finch. (See that brief, page 60 et seq.) 
On the lack of proof of the conspiracy, ~~ r. Erwin 
adopts the brief and argument, so far as applicable to 
his case, presented on behalf of ~Iessrs. Pearce and Finch. 
(See that brief, page 74 et seq.) 
E\:IDENCE ERRONEOUSLY AD:l\IITTED 
1. Kempner's testimony that Stubeck told him that 
h~ collected money from pool halls and card rooms and 
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took it over to l3en IIar.n1on and Ben Harmon split it 
with Erwin and his crowd. 
2. Fisher Harris's testimony relating to the letter 
of January 12-14, 1938 (State Exhibit R). 
3. Evidence of witnesses to the effect that they told 
Mr. Erwin that a pay-off was being conducted. 
4. The testimony of H. K. Record concerning his 
alleged conversation with Mr. Pearce. 
5. The testimony of Golden Holt concerning collec-
tions made by him to and for .AJbe Rosenblum and Ben 
Harmon. 
6. The testimon_y of the prostitutes tha_t they paid 
1noney to Holt. 
With respect to these rna tters vve adopt the argu-
ment made on behalf of 1\iessrs. Pearce and Finch. 
ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN BY THE COURT 
The ~court in instruction 16 intended t-o cover the 
elements that must be proved before any of the defend-
ants could be convicted in this case. However, the court 
erroneously omitted from this instruction and from other 
instructions the element that the overt act must be done 
by one of the conspirators. 
Section 103-11-3 states: 
* * * * unless some act besides such agreement 
is done to effect the object thereof by one or 1nore 
of the parties to such agreement. 
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Instruction 16 n1erely stntt's: (~~)~)-~~)7, nh. 271) 
* • * (5) tlu1t at Iea8t one of tlH_} foll<nving 
overt acts 'vas connnitted: ~ ~ •. 
(6) that any such ovt:•rt aet or art8 was or 
were in furtherance of said conspiracy. agret•lnent 
or combination charged in the indietment. 
Nor has the deficiencY in this instruction been cured 
. . 
by any other instruction given by the court. 
The court erroneously gaYe instruction 18 for in that 
instruction the court instructed : ( 258 ; a b. 27 4) 
* =~= =~= It is enough if the common purpose and 
design was formed in the manner and way as 
charged in the indictment and that any one of 
the alleged overt acts was done in furtherance of 
such design and purpose by either of the defend-
ants $ "' * then the act of either one of the defend-
ants or the acts of said Golden Holt, Ben Harmon 
or Abe Stubeck in furtherance of the common 
purpose and design proved, as aforesaid, will be 
regarded as the act of all. 
This instruction does not give the necessary statu-
tory requirement for one of the overt acts very well 
could have been accomplished by one of the defendants 
or by Golden Holt, Ben Harmon or Abe Stubeck and 
been in furtherance of the common purpose and design 
and still not have been an overt act of one of the parties 
to such agreement for if the act was not done know~gly by 
one of the parties, then such party would not, under the 
court's instruction 19, have been a party to the con-
spiracy unless he had prior thereto entered into the agree-
ment. It is apparent that such act could have been accom-
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plished by one of the defendants without having been an 
act of a conspirator for the defendant Thacker \Vas ac. 
quitted, and though he \vas a defendant, he \vas not a 
conspirator. 
Instruction 9-A is defective in that said instruction 
gave the jury a right to convict anyone who actually par-
ticipated in the conspiracy or in the carrying out of said 
agreement regardless of whether said defendants know-
ingly participated in the coiispiracy or carrying out of 
said agreernent. This instruction is also in conflict ,vith 
instruction 19 as that instruction expressly states that 
one must knowingly participate before he may be a con-
spirator (249). 
Instruction 16 is also erroneous in that it per1nits the 
jury to speculate as to \vhat act might be one of the 
qvert acts necessary to be proved in order to support a 
conviction for said instruction sets out as one of the overt 
acts that might be proved the following: 
(5) * * * 
(d) that between January 6, 1936, and Jan-
uary 1, 1938, the defendants permitted, allowed, 
enabled and assisted a house or houses of ill fame 
to operation in violation of the state statutes and 
of the Ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
A like paragraph is also 1nade in connection with 
lotteries, boolnnaking places, dice gaines, etc. 
By setting forth such alleged overt acts the jury 
would be entitled to consider almost any act or acts of 
anyiine· as an act which had assisted, allowed and en-
abled houses of ill fame and gambling places to operate. 
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For instance, the jury n1ight PYPH g-o ~n t'n r n~ to ~ny that 
if the evidence slHn,·ed that thPre happenPd to hP a gnnt-
bling place operatin~ even though therP had not hPPn 
brought to the attention of dPfendant~ or other partiP~ 
responsible for enforcing the la\\·~ nf the ~tate sutl"ieiPnt 
evidence or inforn1ation to "·arrant an arre~t or tl1e filing 
of so1ue charge or action, that tht'~- ,,·ould be ju~tified in 
bringing in their verdict of guilty 1nerely on the conclu-
~ion that the defendant~ or their e1uployes ~hould haYe 
done something they did not do. To allo'Y a conYiction 
on such a set of facts means that one could be tri.ed on a 
conspiracy and convicted on fact~ or cireu1nstances "·hich 
were not considered by the grand jury nor even in the 
contemplation of the district attorney during the trial of 
the case. X or 'rill the fact that the overt act of collecting 
money which was alsu alleged and given in the instruction 
aid the error for you would have to ~peculate as to ,,·hich 
overt act the jury based its conviction. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant Er-
win's requested instructions X o~. 1:1 and 22~ \Yhich in-
structions are as follo,Ys : 
IxsTRCCTirJX Xo. 19 
You are instructed that the ,,·itness Ben Hun-
sa~r related certain conversations 'vhich he 
claimed he had with the defendant E. B. Erwin. 
You· are instructed that You must not consider 
any such statement alleged to have been made by 
the defendant E. B. Erv{in to the witness Ben Hun-
saker as in any sense being an admission of the 
~aid E. ~· .Erwin th~t he was guilty of enteri~g 
Into a crnninal conspiracy as alleged in the indict-
ment or that he committed any of the overt act~ 
alleged in the indictment. (170 Ab. 297.) 
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INSTRUCTION No. 22 
You are instructed that the witness Fisher 
Harris related certain conversations which he 
claimed he had "vith the defendant E. B. Erwin. 
You are instructed that you must not consider 
any such statement alleged to have been made by 
the defendant E. B. Er\vin to the witness Fisher 
Harris as in any sense being an admission by the 
said E. B. Erwin that he was guilty of entering 
into a criminal conspiracy as alleged in the indict-
nlent or that he comn1itted any of the overt acts 
alleged in the indictment. ( 177 A b. 299.) 
We feel that both of these instructions should have 
been given and that our position is a1nply justified and 
supported by the numerous authorities cited in the brief 
sub1nitted by the defendants Finch and Pearce covering 
'vhat has been designated therein as testimony under clas-
sification No. 2 and set forth between pages 59 and 7 4 in 
said brief, and which authorities "\Ve hereby adopt in 
this brief as if set out in full and ask that they be con-
sidered in connection with these two instructions. 
IMPROPER CONDUCT OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
BY OPENING STATEMENT 
Numerous objections and exceptions were taken to 
the opening statement made by Mr. Rawlings, which 
statement is included in Volume ,r consisting of 73 pages. 
. To appreciate the error committed by such opening 
statement it is necessary to read and analyze the entire 
statement and also to fully appreciate the fact that Mr. 
Rawlings had, prior to his opening statement, full knowl-
edge of just what facts he could and could not prove. 
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This is true becau~e he kne"· "·hat had lwPn introduePd 
before the grand jury and al~o "·hnt had takt\n pine(\ at 
the prenous trial of :Mr. Er"~in and had al~o undonhh\dly 
gone oYer the te~timony of tl1e "·itne~~P~ he '"as going 
to call numerous time~ prior to hi~ opening ~ta te1nent 
in this case. 
-The purpose of an opening ~tatement is to advi~e 
the jury concerning the questions of fact involved so a8 
to prepare their minds for the e\idenee to be heard and 
it is not and should not be permitted to beco1ne an argu-
ment. X or should it contain a staten1ent of facts or eir-
cumstances which he knows cannot be proved or that he 
will not be allowed to prove. 
People \S. ~rnold (ill.), 93 N". E. 786, \Yhere the 
court in discussing an opening statement said: 
The office of an opening statement is to ad-
vise the jury concerning the questions of fact in-
volved, so as to prepare their minds for the evi-
dence to be heard (1 Thompson on Trials 267; 
Pietsch vs. Pietsch, 245 ill. 454, 92 N. E. 325), 
and it is not and should not be, permitted to be-
come an argument. 
If ~Ir. Rawlings was not attempting to argue and 
convince or influence the jury by his opening statement, 
then the following statements should not have been made: 
Right here let me call this mat~er to your 
attention: It is our contention not only that these 
houses and other establishments of vice, covering 
book-making, card rooms, marble games, - not 
only that they were tolerated, that they were 
known about by these defendants, who had knowl-
edge of them, but that in addition to the fact that 
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they were perrnitted to operate, that there was a 
pay-off; and a portion of the rnoney from the 
pay-off given by the operators of these places went 
into the hands of the defendants, in order that 
these establishments rnight run, and as a protec-
tion against their being closed up and the opera-
tors and those in attendance being run out of 
town. 
We shall introduce evidence to show that as 
soon as Mr. Erwin made the request of Mr. Earley 
-I reiterate that this request came early in Jan-
uary of '36, when Mr. Earley was acting as the 
office manager in the Public Safety Department-
that Mr. Earley made some inquiry to determine 
how much was being paid for protection. That 
he deterrnined, and reported to the mayor that 
there "\Vere surns aggregating approxin1ately two 
thousand dollars per month being collected from 
the operators of these vice institutions, including 
prostitutes, operators of the houses, operators of 
book-making establish1nents, operators of card 
games and dice games. (Page 3 add. tr.) 
I have all the confidence in the world that 
this jury can determine when that evidence comes 
in whether or not I am telling the truth. (Page 49 
add. tr.) 
In about September or October, when another 
payment was made- and during the time pay-
ments were brought up to Ogden, mind you, by ~fr. 
Erwin personally, and paid in cash, for which re-
ceipts were requested. In practically every in-
stance, I think, with the exception of one, and Inay-
be two, they were paid to Mr. Hunsaker or to his 
wife, or in one or two instances his son, \vho will 
be produced as a witness; but in each of these 
instances, with the exceptions J 1nentioned, they 
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''"ere paid in ca~h. la rgpr th'noininn tion~ H:.-\ t hP 
year "rent on. \ PngP :)0 add. tr.) 
No"~, a~ T indicated to y{)ll, tlH'~t' paylll('n t~ 
"-ere all n1ade in ea~h, and "·ith the t.\~H·Pptinn of 
those I have 1nentioned, the lath"r on~~ '"~rP n1arle 
in pay1nents in eash in bill~ of $50.00 and $100.00. 
(Page 52 add. tr.) 
.And in Xovenlber-recallJHHY, thi~ i~ the tilne 
that this crusade "·as on by the "-oinen ·~ club~­
~ ~ ~ ~. (Page 53, add. tr.) 
I call your attention to the fact that at thi!-i 
first meeting no question was asked by :Jir. Er"-in 
-no question asked as to who ·was 1uaking eol-
lections. or who "-as involved. (Page 64 add. tr.) 
Nor, as heretofore mentioned, ~hould counsel delib-
erately and knowingly make a staten1ent of a fact w·hich 
he knows he cannot prove. 
State \S. X athoo (Iow·a). 133 X. ,,-. 129: 
.. A.n attorney ought not to he permitted to get 
a matter before the jur!r in an opening statement 
which he must kno'v he 'vill not be allowed to 
prove under the specious pretext that it cannot 
then be said 'vhat evidence will be received. 
And certainly :Jir. Ra,vlings cannot say when he 
made the follo\\ting statement: 
He knows what the evidence is. We vv-ill show, 
in this case, that this money was turned over to 
l\Ir. Erwin, but came through Jf r. Holt's hand:-;. 
(Page 36 add. tr.) 
that he thought the evidence would prove that money had 
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been paid to 1fr. Erwin by Holt or anyone else. This is 
the very thing they endeavored to prove in the previous 
trial and failed and he knew he 'vould be unable to prove 
it. 
State vs. Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 Pac. 113: 
In the opening statement to the jury counsel 
1nay properly fully state all of the material facts 
'vhich the evidence 'vill establish, but not facts 
which the party is not able to prove and none that 
cannot be supported by legal evidence. Bishop's 
Crin1inal Procedure ( 2d Ed.) Vol. 2, Page 791 and 
969. 
1Trorn ~r r. Rawlings' opening staternent, only a s1nall 
portion of 'vhich 've have set forth, it is apparent that 
counsel did not rnerely intend to outline 'vhat ·the evidence 
"\Vould probably be, but intended to paint a vivid picture 
of corruption and illegality that regardless of the evi-
dence that n1ight follow, 'vould rernain in the minds of 
the jury. 
Fro1n the detailed state1nent of the evidence, his ar-
gurnents \vith the court and his fight to put before the 
jury his theory of the case clearly shows that counsel in-
tended by his opening staternent to win at any cost and 
've earnestly contend that such error cannot be cured h~· 
any instruction the court did make. 
We do not \Vaive any assign1nents of error. We adopt 
the points and authorities contained in the brief filed for 
:Thiessrs. Pearce and Finch so far as they are applicable 
to 1\fr. Er,vin. 
We respectfully subrnit that the indictment should 
have been quashed. That it could not be cured by a bill 
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of particulars. That the bill of parti(lula r~ ~honld haYP 
been stricken. That tnt"\ eYiden(~e introdurt'd do(•s not 
support the verdict of the jury. Thnt tlu.' eourt eoJnnlit.tt'd 
grievous error in it~ reeeipt and exelu:..'ion ot' t'Yidt•net•. 
That the instruction~ of the eourt "·ere Ini~leading· and 
allowed the jury to ~peculate a~ to the outronlf' of their 
deliberations and mi~instructed the jury in thP pnrticu-
lars mentioned and contended for. That the error coin-
mitted by the district attorney in trying the case in the 
manner in which he {lid try it depri\ed the defendant 
of a fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B.ALL ~\XD :JIUSSER, 
ED\\ ARD F. RICHARDS, 
... 4 ttorneys for Defendant 
E. B. Eru·in. 
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